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Abstract: This article offers a synoptic narrative informed by a political anthropology that retraces the historical genesis 
of modern nation-state formation in Yemen, and describes the mechanisms of its reproduction as an explanatory prelude 
to the ultimate political implosion of both the Yemeni state and the national polity in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The 
article elucidates the trajectory of the state’s formation through the following tasks: First, it examines the catalytic factors 
and forces that structured the relations between the Yemeni state and the national polity, and systematically reviews the 
institutional and agential consequences in the form of endemic antinomies of governance, which resulted in the 
permanent structural disarticulation between state and nation. Second, it undertakes a history-embedded analysis of the 
state’s adoption of an existential politics that led to a hybrid political system of elite patronage and mass clientelism. 
Third, it performs a structural anatomy of the state formation process that culminated in a cabalistic corporatist state 
exercising a consociational domination over a socio-geographically fragmented polity. And fourth, it assesses the 
impacts of Yemen’s Arab Spring on the likely configuration of the nation-state nexus given the re-emergence of 
centrifugal forces that are threatening to sunder the nation into multiple regional polities.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE DISARTICULATION OF 
NATION AND STATE 
The nation is the imagined community of the State  
[1, p. 406] 
Yemen’s entry into political modernity was 
inaugurated with the 1962 revolution in the north, while 
south Yemen was under British rule until 1967. That 
revolution promised a normative reorientation of the 
state’s institutional practices and of the nation’s political 
culture: From the millennial reign of a feudal theocracy 
ruling a status-based and hierarchically-ranked polity of 
subjects that was overwhelmingly rural and configured 
into territorially bounded fiefs led by hereditary tribal 
shaykhs; to a modern republican state animated by a 
socially radical aspiration to rid Yemen of its pre-
modern social order and to replace it with formal and 
functioning administrative and representative 
institutions for a polity of equal citizens managed by a 
government of technocrats pursuing a project of 
societal transformation. However, the Yemeni 
revolution occurred in the midst of an “Arab Cold War” 
that began in July of 1952 with the Egyptian revolution, 
which overthrew the Egyptian monarchy [2]. This 
consolidated the rise of republican regimes in the 
region, which was previously dominated by feudal 
monarchies. This cold war unleashed an ideological 
struggle over the fate of the Arab world, which pitted 
the secular modernism of pan-Arab nationalism  
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heralded by the revolutionary republican regime of 
Egypt under President ‘Abd al-Nāṣir’s charismatic 
leadership regarded as a beacon of anti-imperialism, 
against the religious traditionalism of pan-Islamism 
defended by the conservative monarchy of Saudi 
Arabia under King Fayṣal perceived as a vassal of 
Western imperialism. Soon after Yemen’s 1962 
revolution, abetted by the Egyptian example, the 
country became embroiled in an eight year civil war, 
which was the theater of a proxy war between the new 
Republican/revolutionary forces supported by Egyptian 
troops and the Royalist/counter-revolutionary forces of 
the overthrown Imamate backed by Saudi Arabia’s 
petro dollars. At stake was whether Yemen would 
revert to a feudal monarchy or become a modern 
republic [3, 4].  
The revolution of 1962 was the catalyst to modern 
state-building as it entailed the overthrow of an ancien 
régime with its feudal governing practices over a 
primordial polity. However, the political settlement of 
the civil war changed the balance of power between 
modernist/nationalist actors and the traditionalist 
/monarchic ones in favor of the latter, which determined 
the nature of nation-building in Yemen. Indeed, 
according to Wimmer and Feinstein [5], as a rule, “The 
balance of power between these actors determines 
which vision of a legitimate political order and which 
institutional principles will prevail” in shaping the nation-
building process (p. 769). In North Yemen, “Rather 
than force a transformation of the [traditionalist] 
periphery to conform to the modernist centre, the 
outlook of the centre… [was made] to encompass 
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many of the goals and values of the periphery”  
[6, p. 99]. This led to the sedimentation of “inertial 
forces” that relegated the country into a post-traditional 
trap: That is, an arrested societal transition that 
indefinitely straddles the rural and the urban and is 
accompanied by stagnation in its cultural, institutional 
and human development. 
As a result, Yemen embarked on a contradictory, 
and ultimately dysfunctional, state and nation-building 
project, as the key components of such a project 
combined into a malignant synergy: (a) the effective 
bureaucratic incorporation of the national territory was 
disabled by weak institutional development through, 
initially by default and subsequently by design, the non-
modernization of the state apparatus; (b) the formation 
of the national polity through the integration of the 
constellation of regionally demarcated tribal polities 
was hindered by the impoverished symbolic resources 
of the state’s political elite (soldiers and tribal shaykhs), 
which deprived them of cultural legitimacy and political 
hegemony (as was the case with the Imamate’s class 
of sāda); (c) the state’s political socialization of a 
modern national polity was undermined by the initial 
prohibition, and subsequent misuse, of the party 
mechanism; and (d) the ideological mobilization of the 
population through the use of nationalism as an 
instrument for the formation of a collective political will 
and a shared national identity failed due to its 
expedient invocation as a mere rhetorical stratagem. 
The legacy was a permanent structural disarticulation 
between the nation and the state that not only 
fomented endemic antinomies of governance, but also 
prevented the state from achieving hegemonic status 
over the national territory. This condemned state 
leaders to a permanent legitimation crisis, which forced 
them to resort to expedient policy-making through what 
I call the state’s existential politics.  
The synoptic narrative that follows provides an 
overview of the historical constitution of the Yemeni 
nation-state and of its contemporary operational 
modality. It elucidates the inaugural vectors of the 
state’s institutional maldevelopment and their 
structuring effects on nation-state formation. These led 
to the state’s adoption of governance practices that 
relied on the deliberate fomentation and tactical 
containment of centrifugal forces in the national polity. 
The different stages of modern state formation in 
Yemen are identified as the effects of a historical path-
dependent process that culminated into the current 
threats to its unitary status.  
2. A MESOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS: HISTORICAL 
GENEALOGY AND STRUCTURAL ANATOMY 
I adopt a political anthropology approach to the 
study of state-society relations in Yemen. However, I 
avoid the epistemic pathos of disciplinary practitioners, 
who seem irremediably committed to the prevalent 
ethnocentric comparative epistemology of political 
anthropology; and thus are still in thrall to a colonialist 
ethic of inquiry. Indeed, the West-stream conception of 
political anthropology “is a marriage between critical 
theory approaches and postmodern, ‘Foucauldian’ 
emphases on power and representation, held together 
by the bottom-up approaches that have always defined 
anthropology” [7]. This “marriage” of critical theory and 
a postmodern perspective is animated by a hubristic 
“constructivist commitment” and a hegemonic 
“interpretivist sensibility” that license the 
anthropologist’s exoticizing representational practices 
of cultural others as theoretical effigies [see 8]. 
Moreover, the anthropology of state-society relations is 
circumscribed within a Gramscian-Andersonian-
Foucauldian-Agambian theoretical quartet: Antonio 
Gramsci postulates the need for the socio-cultural 
hegemony of a ruling class achieved through its 
pedagogical functions and their polity consensus 
building effects, as necessary to the symbolic formation 
of a more sustainable legitimacy of state authority  
[9, 10]. Benedict Anderson predicates a colonial 
capitalism-induced process of “cultural modernization” 
as the catalyst to nation formation that is contingent on 
mass literacy and the availability of printing technology 
for the production of the nation as an “imagined 
community” made up of a mass mediated collectivity of 
discursively constructed citizens [11]. Michel Foucault’s 
discursive regime has bequeathed a hyper-referential 
conception of power as “biopower” that organizes a 
social formation through the “disciplinary effects” of a 
“synaptic regime of power” and its “capillary form of 
existence . . . where power reaches into the very grain 
of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself 
into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, 
learning processes and everyday lives” [12, p. 39]. And 
lastly, Giorgio Agamben, the latest conscript in 
anthropology’s pantheon of oracular theorists, whose 
dystopic vision entails a paranoid anthropology of the 
gulag in which the modern state is obsessed with “the 
paradigm of security as the normal technique of 
government”. This eventually leads to the normalization 
of the concentration camp as a model of state 
governance the world over [13]. These theories are 
appropriated as the universally applicable epistemic 
resources of an “anthropology of the political”, and are 
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reflexively employed as “paradigm of government” to 
elucidate state praxes in the Global South [see 14-16].  
Two ethnographies of state-society relations in 
Yemen are used to briefly illustrate the ramifications of 
anthropological analyses that are informed by the 
discipline’s constructivist orientation and its 
decontextualizing interpretive penchant. This leads to 
the conception of research subjects and contexts as 
symbolic playgrounds for the elaboration of 
theoretically idiosyncratic tales from the field that 
parody the lived experience of cultural others: In the 
first, religious texts simultaneously incarnate Foucault’s 
disciplinary biopower and Anderson’s text-mediated 
construction of citizens in the polity-formation of an 
illiterate society; and in the second, Pierre Bourdieu’s 
symbolic capital comes to the rescue of a sacked pre-
modern elite in a modernizing state. 
Brinkley Messick’s ethnography, The Calligraphic 
State, is an articulation of the Orientalist tradition of 
textual exegesis and the anthropological vocation of 
face-to-face interaction, leading to a hybrid practice: An 
“ethnography of texts.” He sought to offer Yemen as a 
counter-intuitive exemplification of how Foucault’s 
biopower and Anderson’s mass mediation are achieved 
through the dissemination of the textual productions of 
the religious-judicial elite (al-‘ulamā’). Paradoxically, 
indeed incredibly, in an overwhelmingly illiterate 
society, the diffusion of these texts mediates as well as 
disciplines the theocratic regime’s subjects into a polity 
through a process of “textual domination”. Messick 
seems justifiably doubtful about the theoretical 
plausibility of his “discursive history” as he ends it with 
an ironic disclaimer that suggests an opportunistic 
theoretical instrumentalization of others’ historical 
experience: He refers to the nonexistence of a “specific 
polity” but merely an imaginative “construct” of a 
“composite of historical materials” [17, p. 255].  
Gabriele Vom Bruck’s ethnography, Islam, Memory, 
and Morality in Yemen, is a narrative about a text-
mediated adjustment strategy deployed by a cohort of 
hereditary elite (al-sāda) who held government posts in 
the Imamate and are afflicted with a politically 
engendered existential condition – societal exclusion – 
under the new republican regime in the post-1962 
revolution period. Her subjects’ predicaments are 
abstracted through Bourdieu’s symbolic lexicon as they 
are made to participate in a “moral economy” within the 
private sphere through reliance on their “cultural 
capital” (i.e., their expert knowledge of the Zaydī 
creedal repertoire) as they perform taqlīd (the recitation 
of Zaydī religious texts). In this way an existential 
condition is remedied through a symbolic act. As taqlīd 
instantiates a “habitus” through which they engaged in 
the quietist propitiation of the state’s animosity towards 
them and a discursive accommodation to their status 
demotion, social exclusion and political subordination. 
However, this quietism is at odds with the sāda’s 
activist doctrinal imperative: namely “to ordain right and 
forbid wrong”, which is pursued through the practice of 
khurūj (i.e., rising against an unjust ruler) that obliges 
its adherents to oppose injustice. The author’s 
preference for examining her research subjects’ 
domestic management of their social exclusion through 
“moral rearmament”, instead of their historical agency 
within the public sphere, led her to neglect khurūj. It is 
the latter that helps us understand the initial motivation 
of the current rulers of parts of Yemen (al-Ḥūthī tribe) 
who are the progeny of the sāda [18, 19]. 
The framing conceit of these theories’ Eurocentric 
genealogy and comparative standpoint subordinates 
disciplinary practice to the primacy of the Western 
episteme and sensibility and reifies the anthropology of 
the political into a survey of the effects of Western 
societies on non-Western ones. The end result is the 
generification of the world’s societal and institutional 
diversity through the diffusion of a regional ethno-
epistemology that insists on its universal relevance and 
thus distorts the empirical elucidation and theoretical 
explanation of other regions. Moreover, these theories 
are consensually subservient to an idealized model of 
liberal democracy and to an extroverted neoliberal 
political economy as a universal comparative 
framework. This comparative framework is based on an 
anachronistic ideal animated by a delusional conviction 
about the historical inevitability, and permanent 
sustainability, of the Western model’s global 
hegemony. The use of both the theoretical quartet and 
the dysfunctional neoliberal democracy model1 betrays 
                                            
1 Indeed, existing liberal democracies in their milieu of origin can be 
described, at best, as “relative democracies” given their endemic deficiencies: 
The upper-class bias of their policies, the mass inequality produced by their 
economic regime, the hierarchical racial classification of their polities, the 
bribes-mediated election of their political representatives, and the political 
subordination and financial dependency of their governments on a class of 
plutocrats. Moreover, the chronic spectacle of political entropy, and systemic 
dysfunction displayed by the Euro-American exemplars of such a regime 
betrays a credibility deficit about its promises and suggests an intrinsic 
vulnerability to elite capture, and thus ultimately represents a status quo 
maintaining, not transforming, political regime. For the globe-trotting “liberal 
universalists” promoting democracy abroad through a deceptive rhetoric and 
venal ethic, this presents an obligation to spread the message in their home 
countries in the Global North that democracy cannot be exported through a 
Western hegemony sustaining project, but through the authentic 
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their advocates’ imperious intellectual sensibility as 
they authorize the historical disembedding and 
analytical instrumentalization of non-Western social 
formations. Moreover, their continued use as the 
prevailing knowledge production templates, or society 
cloning toolkit, is no longer legitimate in the emerging 
post-universalist conjuncture of the social sciences. 
This conjuncture’s three defining characteristics deflate 
the globalizing pretention of such practices: (a) the 
intrinsic individuality and thus non-convergence of the 
historical trajectories of each one of the world’s panoply 
of social formations; (b) the inexorable divergence of 
the institutional configuration of their polities; and (c) 
the incommensurable plurality of values that motivate 
their aspirational horizons [20].  
This article offers a meso-analytical synopsis of the 
underlying and constantly evolving power dynamics of 
state politics in Yemen that reconstructs the Yemeni 
state’s historical genealogy of emergence and 
anatomizes its structural transformation process. This 
synopsis, however, emphasizes the roles and impacts 
of regional and local actors and relatively neglects 
those of international actors. Western governments 
since the Cold War up to the present War on Terror, 
were instrumental in fostering and sustaining the 
Yemeni state’s democracy deficit among other 
institutional pathologies. However, their self-serving 
development aid, institutional reforms and policy advice 
did not always initiate, but mostly exacerbated, 
governance dysfunctions (e.g., economic liberalization 
and democratization schemes that promoted crony 
capitalism and perpetuated authoritarianism) [see 21, 
22, 23]. Accordingly, the narrative below inventories the 
state’s varying polity formation strategies that were 
adopted in response to changes in its local and 
regional political environment. Also, it identifies the key 
constitutive factors that determined both the nature of 
state-society relations and the structure of the 
emergent political community: The political 
incorporation and administrative subordination of 
people and territory; the policy regime and its resource 
allocation rationale; the composition of elites and power 
distribution among them; the population’s ideological 
mobilization to induce state identification and its 
                                                                          
exemplification of democratic practices “back home”, especially toward 
racialized minorities, ethnicized immigrants and the marginalized working 
classes. Sadly, an ever increasing proportion of the Global North’s polities 
have opportunistically abandoned their specious profession of a tolerant 
liberalism to furiously embrace a primal xenophobia that shuns human diversity 
and promotes the West as a demographic exclusion zone.  
political socialization to engender polity formation; and 
the coercive interventions of regional powers and their 
institutional ramifications. To understand their operation 
and effects in Yemen, I engage in a temporally 
demarcated analysis of nation-state formation and 
state-society relations embedded within their 
communal, national and regional dynamics. My 
approach to political anthropology privileges a 
historical contextualization of the exigencies animating 
the state’s governance strategies and an analytical 
assessment of their effects on nation-state formation 
and state-society relations. In doing so, it identifies the 
vectors that generated the conditions of possibility for 
establishing a Yemeni political community.  
The information on which this article is based were 
accumulated over a dozen years of resident social 
learning through continuous experiential immersion in 
Yemeni society as a United Nations development 
professional and subsequently as a local researcher. 
Also, as a long-term resident I was a client of 
government services, and a participant in all of the 
routines of an ordinary citizen’s daily life. This is 
complemented with a critical engagement with the 
relevant scholarly literature on history, politics and the 
policy literature of international agencies. There is, 
however, a caveat: While my disciplinary training was 
in anthropology the narrative that is offered below is not 
an ethnographic one, as I do not share its foundational 
assumption that the domain of micro-relations (i.e., 
accounts of the individual experiences of both 
researcher and research subjects) is the primary 
generative source of social reality, which leads to the 
fetishism of the minutiae of everyday life. Moreover, I 
reject the ethnocentric practice of anthropology, which 
privileges the dissemination of metropolitan travelling 
theory instead of theory formation grounded in the local 
research context. Accordingly, I adopt a mesographic 
approach [see 24, 25], which (a) sunders the imagined 
umbilical cord between anthropology and ethnography 
and substitutes the latter’s self-centric research 
protocol with a socio-centric one (i.e., mesography); (b) 
assumes that the individual is the sentient artefact of 
the collectivity’s shared horizon of possibilities allowed 
by the prevailing state-society covenant; and (c) 
postulates that this covenant incubates the social 
opportunities around which everyday life is organized. 
This approach entails a constellational perspective that 
encompasses multiple analytical scales to produce a 
history-embedded and institution-mediated explanatory 
narrative about the formation of a social collectivity into 
a political community. Accordingly, it situates the 
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research domain within its historical context (i.e., 
historical genealogy), anatomizes the macro-structural 
processes (i.e., state formation), in order to elucidate 
the effects on meso societal structures (i.e., institutions 
formation) and on micro local life-worlds (e.g., citizens’ 
agency). The next section analyses the historical 
vectors that led to the Yemeni state’s adoption of an 
existential politics and inventories the effects on the 
nation-state nexus. 
3. STATE EXISTENTIAL POLITICS: FRACTURING 
THE NATION-STATE 
 The Yemeni case illustrates the effects of path-
dependence as an axiom of state formation: Catalytic 
socio-political events engender pivotal historical 
conjunctures, which determined the conditions under 
which states made strategic decisions; and once these 
decisions are taken, they tend to become an 
irreversible and permanently constraining political and 
institutional legacy. How Yemen’s institutional evolution 
got stuck in a path-dependent trajectory is axiomatically 
expressed in this way by Slater [26]: “by organizing 
actors in particular ways at the outset of a new political 
dispensation, leaders create structures that assume a 
momentum of their own” (p. 18). This is exemplified in 
the seminal effects on state-society relations from the 
fact that the civil war ended in a relative stalemate 
between the two antagonists, as Burrowes [27] 
identified them in the then prevailing nomenclature: 
The majority “traditionalists” (al-taqlīdiyyun) made up of 
tribal groups and religious conservatives, and the 
minority “modernists” (al-‘aṣriyyun) composed of 
educated professionals and urban residents. This 
resulted in the neutralization of the modernist 
aspirations of the revolution as the traditionalist forces 
achieved representational parity, if not primacy, in all 
state institutions. The ensuing national reconciliation 
promoted a minimalist conception of national unity, as it 
authorized the practice of regional sovereignty, which 
institutionalized the regional and military autonomy of 
the northern tribal formations into a plethora of 
sovereign enclaves under primordial leadership. This 
led to the consolidation of the political dominance of 
politically opportunistic shaykhs willing to generate rent 
from their tribes’ warrior ethos over a rural-led economy 
and over a national population that was overwhelmingly 
rural (93% in 1970) and already organized into 
fragmented tribal formations. Moreover, the 
mountainous topography of the national territory with a 
widely dispersed residential pattern of low population 
density presented a perennial challenge to the Yemeni 
state capacity to project its authority beyond urban 
areas, and thus ensured the tribal shaykhs’ role as 
politically indispensable state partners. 
The discussion that follows addresses the critical 
factors that circumscribed the trajectory of nation-state 
formation in Yemen: (i) it identifies the key policy 
decisions about institutional choices and political actors 
that consolidated into vectors of state formation; (ii) it 
presents a historical overview of the Yemeni state’s 
evolution; (iii) it analyzes the rise and demise of 
nationalism as an ideology of polity formation and 
social cohesion; (iv) it elucidates the effects of regional 
influences on state structure and political culture; (v) it 
explains the persistence of primordial structures in the 
national polity’s configuration; (vi) it describes the 
nature of the regime and its maintenance strategies; 
and (vii) it illuminates the state’s governance culture 
through a comprehensive tabular presentation of its 
operational norms. 
3.1. Path-Dependence Vectors: Institutionalizing 
History 
The structuring vectors of Yemen’s contemporary 
architecture of state-society, or nation-state, relations 
were inaugurated within the immediate aftermath of the 
1962 revolution. Indeed, within a month after the 
revolution, the government promulgated a number of 
decrees that sought to institutionalize the role of tribes 
within the state. The establishment of the Supreme 
Defense Council gave a prominent role to the “warranty 
shaykhs” (al-mashāyikh al-ḍamān) the senior tribal 
leaders of the north. The following year, more tribes-
promoting institutions were established: The Supreme 
Council for Tribal Affairs was created and placed under 
the chairmanship of the President of the Yemen Arab 
Republic (YAR); tribes were required to establish Tribal 
Shaykhs’ Councils throughout the new Republic at the 
governorate and at the district and sub-district levels. In 
addition, there were the Central Committee for Tribal 
Affairs, and the Ministry of Tribal Affairs. The latter was 
replaced in 1968 by the Department of Tribal Affairs, 
which is still the main liaison agency between the state 
and the tribes and its primary responsibility is the 
distribution of monthly stipends to tribal shaykhs [28]. 
Furthermore, the 1970 constitutional ban on the 
formation of political parties (Article 37: “Partisanship in 
all its form is prohibited”) prevented the organized 
political mobilization of urban-based groups that could 
counter the political hegemony of tribes. As a result, 
the first parliamentary elections held in 1971 led to the 
establishment of the Consultative Council (majlis al-
shūrā) as the first national legislative institution whose 
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159 members were overwhelmingly tribal shaykhs. This 
tribe-centric institutional structure (a) engendered a 
transition from an autonomous tribalism under the 
Imamate to a state-incorporated tribalism under the 
new republic; (b) consecrated the tribes as the 
preeminent national power broker in the emergent civil-
political society of the YAR; and (c) consolidated the 
traditional social structure to the detriment of the 
emergence of a modern one. Subsequently, the 
dominant political orientation and institutional 
configuration of the YAR was dominated by a 
triumvirate of political actors: The military, the tribes 
and the Islamists. These actors were to determine the 
nature of the unification of the two Yemeni states 
through an “annexationist politics” and maintained their 
influence over the politics of the unified Yemeni state to 
the present [29].  
This was the condition of possibility that constrained 
the state into a patronage system in which, initially, 
state policy privileged primordial affiliations based on 
tribes and regions, and emphasized the cooptation of 
their most influential individual representatives, to 
whom was bestowed the prerogative of controlling and 
mobilizing their particular constituencies on behalf of 
the state. Indeed, tribes were perceived as self-
organizing communities, and were promoted as the 
foundational political unit of the state. This led to the 
permanent institutionalization of the “stipendiary 
regime”: The quintessential practice (which was 
employed prior to the dawn of Islam, during the 
Imamate period and ever since the 1962 revolution) of 
paying tribes a regular stipend, or more accurately a 
bribe, in exchange for not challenging the state’s 
authority and for their service as mercenary forces. The 
state relied on this practice as its primary means of 
placating its potential political challengers and of 
maintaining its political stability. In this way, the state 
systematically nurtured, while it tactically contained, the 
centrifugal forces represented by the regional tribal 
formations. This strategy subsequently became an 
indispensable part of the Yemeni state’s modus 
operandi. During, and since, the civil war the Yemeni 
state engaged in a competitive bidding contest with 
Saudi Arabia for the loyalty of these arms-bearing 
tribes, who can be mobilized into militias against or for 
the state.2 The political exigency to accommodate 
                                            
2 Indeed, from the 1970s onward tribal stipends were one of the principal 
sources of the state’s chronic budget deficit. For example, in 1971 nearly 40 
million riyals were allocated to tribes, while the government collected taxes 
these centrifugal forces partly prevented the Yemeni 
state from achieving the basic axiom of state formation: 
Monopoly over the legitimate means of violence that 
would have enabled the state to establish unitary 
sovereignty over the national territory. However, 
tribalism in contemporary Yemen is not a natural social, 
cultural and political heritage, partly bequeathed by its 
ecological milieu – i.e., the geographically remote and 
topographically mountainous and thus isolated nature 
of their residential habitats. Instead, tribalism’s modern 
manifestation derives from a history-contingent, power-
driven, culturally-adapted, and politically-molded social 
organization managed by opportunistic and politically 
entrepreneurial local/regional shaykhs who were 
selectively supported by regional powers to establish 
and sustain their hegemony over their rural fiefdoms as 
primordial polities.3 
The state’s failure to achieve both monopoly over 
arms and sovereignty over territory was to exercise a 
permanent centrifugal effect on nation-state formation 
and state-society relations. The end result was a 
chronic condition of “aborted state and nation-building”, 
that eventually led to the consecration of tribes as the 
primary, if not sole, means available to the Yemeni 
state initially to establish, and subsequently to sustain, 
the local administration of an overwhelmingly rural 
polity [33]. The 1962 revolution dethroned the 
traditional ruling class (al-sāda) and marginalized their 
administrative classes of clerics (al-‘ulamā’) and judges 
(al-quḍa). They were not replaced by a modern 
national bourgeoisie in the state’s leadership4, but by 
an opportunistic aggregation of corporate groups 
                                                                          
(zakāt) were less than 11 million riyals [30, p. 262]. When the Prime Minister at 
the time decided to eliminate this stipendiary regime he was forced to resign 
[31]. This regime has ever since constrained state governance. 
3 This argument is contrary to the recurrent use of the discredited 
Orientalist thesis that tribalism is an ontological fatality of peoples and the 
historical destiny of countries in the Middle East/West Asia region, which is 
considered a bastion of irremediably primordial states: “tribes with flags” (see 
[32]). 
4 Yemen’s socio-political environment did not enable the emergence of a 
modern nationalist bourgeoisie as the state’s political leadership. However, 
there was a relatively small cadre educated abroad who constituted a secular 
minded and reformist middle class that was recruited into the state 
bureaucracy as its technocratic servants [34]. One shaykh from a prominent 
qāḍī family described this class of technocrats as ‘abd al-mukhlaṣ lil dawlah 
(“faithful slave of the state”). Indeed, their subservient role is exemplified in the 
memoirs of Muḥsin Al-‘Ayni (see [31]). Whatever class passes for a 
bourgeoisie in Yemen is conscripted into the state as its venal retainers. 
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dominated by military strongmen as heads of state in 
collusion with tribal shaykhs as war lords. This new 
“elite” was primarily endowed with coercive capital, 
which incentivized factional competition over territorial 
sovereignty, and thus sustained the regional 
fragmentation of the country and polity. Consequently, 
they failed to pursue national polity integration and the 
structural transformation of society. 
The genesis, reproduction and change of this 
political legacy is summarized in Table 1, which offers 
an overview of the changing nature of the state in 
Yemen over a century demarcated into different 
historical conjunctures. The tabular presentation (a) 
provides a genealogy of Yemen’s modern nation-state 
formation process that belies the assumption of 
historical immutability; (b) outlines the structural 
anatomy and identifies the vectors of change for each 
of the different regimes; and (c) proposes a new 
political taxonomy for the Yemeni state that replaces 
the prevailing descriptive terms that are of little 
heuristic value (e.g., “pluralized authoritarianism”, 
“unique authoritarianism”, “competitive 
authoritarianism”, etc.). The title of each regime is 
based on the dominant characteristic of its power 
configuration: Tribal libertarianism is based on a 
network of bilateral agreements between the state as a 
monopolistic agency and selected tribal shaykhs as 
client groups to ensure their political allegiance. 
Primordial federalism is based on the shared 
sovereignty between an urban-based military-led 
regime and rural-based leaders of tribal confederations 
with delegated jurisdictional authority. Republican 
tribalism entailed the incorporation of the south into a 
unified national polity based on the tribal administrative 
practices of northern civic tradition that promotes a 
polity organized into tribes. And cabalistic corporatism 
reflects the transition from an extended family-
circumscribed authoritarian rule to an oligarchic 
coalition based on a regime maintenance pact between 
selected representatives of corporate groups. 
Accordingly, the table identifies the catalytic events that 
initiated the formation of each type of regimes, and 
highlights their impacts on polity configuration, the 
culture of governance and the economic underpinnings 
[35]. Two caveats: First, the table merely serves as 
historical background to the analysis of the nature of 
the contemporary regime; and second, it does not 
include the transitions of the south Yemeni state (1967-
1990), given the ultimate primacy of the northern 
regime following unification.  
 
Table 1: Transitional Phases of State Formation in Yemen  
Regime Types 
Tribal Libertarianism Primordial Federalism Republican Tribalism Cabalistic Corporatism Defining Aspects 
Pre-revolution (1918-1962) Post-revolution (1962-1990) Unification (1990-2000) Implosion (2001-2012)  
Catalytic 
Events 
▪1918 inaugurates 
independent Imamate after 
withdrawal of Ottoman 
Turks. 
▪1920s and beyond state 
operates as an extensive tax 
extraction apparatus over a 
polity of subjects whose 
raison d’être is to pay tax. 
▪1930s heralded mass 
emigration of Shāfi’ī 
merchants and peasants in 
protest of excessive 
taxation, which led to 
organized political 
opposition.  
▪1934 Saudi Arabia’s 
capture of Yemen’s territory 
led to social reform 
movements and the rise of 
the Free Yemeni Movement 
and ultimately to the 1962 
revolution.  
▪1962 Revolution was 
trapped into an “Arab Cold 
War” between Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia.  
▪1962-1970 civil war 
instituted a power asymmetry 
between rural communities 
and urban society. 
▪1970s policy decisions led 
to permanent dependence 
on tribes as pillars of the new 
state.  
▪1974-1977 under al-
Ḥamdī’s rule sought in vain 
to break tribal domination of 
the state and society. 
▪1978 rise of ‘Alī ‘Abdāllah 
Ṣāliḥ as YAR’s President 
consolidated use of tribes in 
territorial governance.  
 
 
▪1990 (May 22) unification 
of North and South Yemen 
into the Republic of Yemen.  
▪1990 (August 2) Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait and 
Yemen’s neutrality towards 
it led Gulf monarchies to 
expel one million migrants 
ending the flow of 
remittances.  
▪1993 parliament elections 
dashed the unification 
vision of the South. 
▪1994 civil war led to the 
hegemony of North’s tribe-
centric regime. 
▪1999 first Presidential 
elections won by Ṣāliḥ 
entrenched the family ruled 
shadow state. 
 
 
▪2001 war on terror led to 
Yemen’s conscription as a 
front against Islamic 
extremism and under 
permanent drone surveillance.  
▪2000s heralded donors’ 
policy ambiguity (security over 
democracy) that strengthened 
the state’s repressive 
apparatus and emboldened its 
use. 
▪2004 marked the rise of 
peripheral political actors and 
the threat of territorial 
balkanization: Al-Ḥūthī’s 
autonomous regionalism, and 
Southern Movement’s 
secessionism. 
▪2011 Yemen’s Arab Spring 
led to President Ṣāliḥ’s 
demise in February 2012, and 
to a civil war in 2014. 
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Actors' 
Network 
▪Hegemony of a hereditary 
ruling dynasty governing a 
polity of subjects organized 
into a hierarchy based on 
religious, genealogical and 
regional criteria.  
▪Collusion of a status-based 
elite with selected tribes 
against the peasantry and 
small merchants. 
▪Recognition of tribal 
jurisdictional sovereignty as 
the Imam selectively sub-
contracted northern tribal 
shaykhs as retainers of the 
state, and their tribes as 
state militias.  
 
▪Concentration of power in 
heads of armed forces, 
important tribal shaykhs, and 
Sunni Islamists. 
▪Rise of Local Development 
Associations (LDAs) in 1963 
for the economic 
development of rural life. 
▪Start of Saudi Arabia’s 
hegemonic influence in 
Yemen’s politics through 
bribing of key tribal actors. 
▪Consolidation of a socio-
political power imbalance 
between a weak central state 
and strong rural non-state 
actors. 
 
▪Military-led regime with 
officers in civilian suits 
incarnated power 
permanently. 
▪Institutionalization of most 
tribal shaykhs as retainers 
of the state, and of political 
nepotism in key state and 
society’s institutions. 
▪Southern polity’s political 
agency is disabled by state 
policies that produced 
unequal citizenship. 
▪CSOs multiplied in 
response to donors’ 
initiatives for democracy 
promotion and 
development. 
▪Full normalization of the 
practice of elite patronage and 
mass clientelism assimilated 
the national polity into the 
venal culture of state 
governance.  
▪Disciplinary effects of this 
governance culture led to: (a) 
the public sector’s endemic 
ethical deficit; (b) the private 
sector’s mutation into a rent 
seeking network; (c) civil 
society’s adoption of an ethos 
of financial opportunism; (d) 
citizens’ addiction to financial 
incentives; and (e) political 
opposition’s submission to an 
ethic of accommodation.  
 
Governance 
Logic 
▪Feudal governance 
practices: e.g., hostage-
taking of sons of main tribal 
groups as rebellion 
prevention measure; and 
selective insulation from the 
outside world. 
▪Strict policing of a sectarian 
division based on status-
prescribed social roles 
between Zaydī tribesmen 
and Shāfi’ī townsmen. 
▪Sharī’a was the theocratic 
state’s legal framework 
adjudicated by a religious 
elite, al-‘ulamā’. 
▪Territorial control is 
exercised through the 
tactical incorporation of most 
important tribal federations. 
▪State’s de facto recognition 
of tribes as autonomous 
communities in a 
geographically dispersed and 
regionally segmented polity. 
▪Shared governance 
between state and primordial 
groups in which urban areas 
are under state jurisdiction 
and rural areas are under 
tribal sovereignty. 
▪State legitimacy depended 
on accountability to tribes’ 
interest and their inclusion in 
state institutions.  
▪Selection of state leadership 
through military and tribes 
brokered appointment, not 
through election. 
 
▪Inauguration of multi-party 
electoral politics unleashed 
the state’s generalization of 
clientelist politics as 
national polity’s political 
incorporation strategy. 
▪Administrative 
incorporation of the South 
through the North’s 
organizational vernacular 
atrophied institutional 
modernization and 
corrupted state’s republican 
form.  
▪Political hegemony of 
traditional northern 
sociocultural practices led 
to re-tribalization of the 
southern polity and its 
enforced pietization by the 
state’s Islamist proxies.  
▪Establishment of elected 
Local Councils in 2001 led to 
total subordination of regional 
and local councils to the 
central government. 
▪State’s tactical alternation 
between political liberalization 
and de-liberalization as a 
deceptive means of complying 
with donors’ requirements. 
▪Recruitment of CSOs as 
retainers of state, proxies of 
political factions, and courtiers 
of foreign donors’ interests. 
▪State’s vertical accountability 
to corporatist elites prevails 
over its horizontal 
accountability to ordinary 
citizens. 
 
Economic 
Base 
▪Collapse of the coffee trade 
and end of Ottoman 
patronage led to the state’s 
total dependency on the 
direct taxation of the 
population, and to the shift 
from subsistence to 
commercial qāt cultivation to 
replace coffee as cash crop. 
▪Every hamlet, village and 
town was a fiscal extraction 
unit in which Shāfi’ī 
merchants and peasants 
were taxed 
disproportionately.  
▪Strategic distribution of tax 
farming privileges as 
patronage to selected tribes 
and status groups. 
▪Labor remittances from 
Yemeni migrants in the 
Arabian Peninsula funded 
LDAs projects, which 
exceeded government 
contribution to GNP, and 
their imports were the main 
source of government 
revenues through customs.  
▪Discovery of oil in Mā’rib in 
1984 generated carbon rent 
that initiated the state’s fiscal 
independence from the 
population. 
▪Rise of qāt production as a 
pillar of the rural economy 
and the constitution of a qāt 
lords lobby.  
▪Discovery of oil in 
Ḥaḍramawt in 1992 led to 
consolidation of carbon rent 
dominated economy and to 
the state’s complete fiscal 
autonomy from the polity.  
▪Structural adjustment 
program in 1995 mobilized 
Western aid, and placed 
national economic policy 
under the managerial and 
political diktats of Western 
donors.  
▪Economic liberalization 
measures led to crony 
capitalism based on a 
corrupt economic 
sovereignty protection 
strategy for an elite cabal. 
▪International community 
entered into an implicit 
resource allocation pact to 
sustain regime’s stability to 
fight war on terror.  
▪Start of natural gas export in 
October 2009 replenished the 
regime resources to co-opt 
political challengers and 
enrich capitalist cronies.  
▪International aid was 
allocated (a) to training and 
arming security forces, (b) to 
a cynical philanthropy that 
promotes a dependent 
“development”, and (c) to 
ineffectual radicalization 
prevention experiments.  
 
3.2. Nationalism: Contingent Process & Expedient 
Discourse 
Nationalism expresses the constitutive symbiosis 
between nation and state. As Smith [36] noted: “The 
state [is] the necessary condition and matrix for the 
gestation of national loyalties” (p. 59). Hence the 
importance of clarifying the emergence, mutation and 
ultimate demise of nationalism in Yemen. This is all the 
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more necessary in view of the recent publication of 
three texts that focused on the intersection of nation, 
state and nationalism in Yemen and that examine 
whether the rise of a unified Yemen is the product of a 
historically inherent or contingent process. Unwittingly, 
all three texts rehearse the perennial contention – 
paraphrasing Anderson [11] – between nationalists’ 
insistence on the “subjective antiquity” of their nation, 
and historians’ contrary assertion of its “objective 
modernity” (p. 5). 
Willis’ book [37] offers a counter-narrative of 
Yemen’s nation-state formation process between 1857 
and 1934 that is “meant to evoke possible histories 
rather than a single and hegemonic history” (p. 14). Its 
primary aim is “to question the inevitability and 
naturalness of a unified Yemen by engaging in the type 
of history of spaces and powers… [that] destabilizes 
the historicism of modernity and its agents” (p. 6, 8). 
This is pursued though a Foucault-inspired interpretive 
reconstruction of historical archives. The resulting 
narrative privileges an externally mediated “spatial 
history of modern Yemen”, while it rejects the locally 
produced “national historical narrative of modern, 
unified Yemen [that] has assumed the presence of a 
singular Yemeni space and identity waiting to be 
discovered” (p. 198). Accordingly, he “spatially” 
articulates North Yemen’s state formation with a pan-
Islamic polity constituted by an “anti-imperialist Sunni-
Salafi movement”, in which the Imam was supposed to 
be a leading protagonist. And South Yemen is 
theorized as being “inextricably entwined” to the 
“durbar form of rule” of British India’s “Ornamentalist” 
project of state-building as spectacle, which caricatures 
the South into “Aden and the nine tribes” as an 
instantiation of the Raj and its constellation of native 
Indian princes (see [38]). The book betrays a post-
modernist theory-led interpretivism that exoticizes 
research subjects’ historical experience and that turns 
history into a “what if” epistemological experiment.  
Day’s project [39] is to discard once and for all 
Yemen’s “unionist mythology”, which served as its 
ideology of nationalism, with its “illusory notion that one 
people, the sons of Qaḥṭān, ever lived in unison on a 
single territory… from ancient to modern times” (p. 43). 
In fact, the “sons of Qaḥṭān” is the legacy of an early 
medieval discursive formation known as the “Qaḥṭān 
Saga” that articulated a culture war (still continuing) 
that was initially founded on the comparatively rich 
civilizational endowments of southern Arabs over their 
civilization-deprived northern counterparts.5 After the 
1962 revolution, it served not as a nationalist ideology 
but as an ostracizing political slogan for the ethno-
cultural delegitimization of the former ruling class of the 
Zaydi Imamate (al-Sāda) who were of northern Arab 
origin as the descendants of ‘Adnān and thus 
considered inauthentic Yemenis. Betraying a 
misunderstanding of Yemeni politics, the author 
imperiously asserts that Yemen was never destined to 
be either a unitary state or a unified nation, as it was 
always riven by endemic regionalism, which is the 
source of all of its contemporary political problems (see 
[41]). As a solution, he arbitrarily divides the country 
into seven ethno-regions based on a set of whimsical 
criteria that includes culinary and sartorial markers. 
Unhelpfully, the concluding sentence of the book 
essentializes Yemen’s geography and polity with a 
prophecy: “Yemen will endure as a fragmented polity, 
just as it has for millennia” (p. 311).  
Wedeen studies the manifestation of Yemeni 
nationalism through a “performative politics of words”, 
in which public discourse substitutes for state 
institutions [42]. Intriguingly, she contests the modernity 
of nationalism based on the mistaken “historical 
connection in the West between the idea of the nation 
and the project of secularism”. In contrast, she argues 
that “nationalism often develops in tandem with other 
ideologies or master narratives, and sometimes 
combines with them” (p. 14). This argument merely 
confirms the discursive instrumentality, and thus 
demagogic invocation, of nationalism, as Wimmer and 
Feinstein explains [5], since “dynastic rulers sought to 
contain nationalism by adopting it as a state doctrine 
themselves” (p. 768). This is exemplified in the case of 
North Yemen’s theocratic regime, which 
opportunistically joined the United Arab Republic (see 
below). By insisting that the presumed symbiosis 
between nationalism and secularism is a liberal 
teleology and making it her cheval de bataille, she 
betrays a liberal epistemic charity toward the arrogated 
legitimacy and parodic modernity of anachronistic 
theocratic and primordial regimes. This obviates the 
historical significance of changes in the institutional 
infrastructure of the state and in the configuration of its 
                                            
5 According to Mahoney [40], the Yemeni polymath Abū Muḥammad al-
Ḥasan al-Hamdānī (893-945) was “the most celebrated advocate of the Qaḥṭān 
Saga in the early medieval period.” And his 10 volumes Al-Iklīl (The Crown) 
“represents a celebratory works that establishes the identity and superiority of 
the South Arabian tribes”, (p.69).  
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polity as occurred in North Yemen’s transition from a 
pre-modern polity hierarchically segregated into status 
groups and sects under the coercive rule of a 
theocratic state, to a modern political community with 
representative institutions for a national polity of 
sovereign and equal citizens envisioned by the 1962 
revolution.  
Alas, these scholars’ discussion of the nature of 
nationalism and nation-state formation in Yemen is 
burdened by instrumentalizing discursive practices: 
The idiosyncratic historicization of the country, the 
interpretive decontextualization of local facts, and the 
theoretical dis-embedding of research subjects from 
their local structures of experience. The end result are 
narratives of even less plausibility than the Yemeni 
“myth”, which leave the reader bereft of a grounded 
understanding of the mechanism of nationalism’s 
emergence and subsequent mutation in Yemen. These 
authors’ arguments are rendered moot by the fact that 
historical contingency was always the driving force both 
in the divergent trajectories of the rise of the modern 
state and its founding ideology of nationalism. Indeed, 
contingency is the norm in all the key texts on 
nationalism regardless of the perennialist or inevitabilist 
claims of elite protagonists [11, 43, 44]. The critical 
issue is to identify the actual trajectory of its adoption 
within a given social formation. In the case of Yemen, 
the emergence of the modern nation-state and 
nationalism is contingently situated within the 
synergistic conjuncture between the following factors: 
(a) the demonstration effects of a regional model; (b) 
the intensification of political conflicts between 
segments of society; (c) the availability of technology of 
dissemination and of coercion; and (d) elite-induced 
public demands for social transformation that would 
establish a polity of equal citizens within a modern 
nation-state.6 Indeed, Fred Halliday’s 1997 article [45] 
deploys a “comparative contingency” approach to 
illustrate how both North and South Yemen 
accommodated those factors in their distinctive ways. 
As he explained: “what might seem to be exogenous, 
mimetic, adoption of general Arab nationalist terms 
concealed a modular, endogenous usage” among 
northern and southern political leaders. And Abdallah 
                                            
6 Cf. Hobsbawm [44, p. 10] and Wimmer and Feinstein [5, p.769-770]. 
Noteworthy is that these four catalytic factors in the constitution of Yemen’s 
national “imagined community” are different from, and thus suggest the limited 
applicability of, Anderson’s [11] global hypothesis about nation formation: “a 
system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of 
communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity” (p. 43).  
Bujra [46] depicted how these factors played out in the 
rural areas of the South through the capillary effects of 
an anti-colonial national liberation movement on the 
introduction of modern form of collective loyalty 
(citizenship) over primordial ones (tribalism), and on 
the replacement of hierarchical social relations with 
egalitarian ones. The historical trajectory of the rise, 
adoption and demise of nationalism in Yemen 
generated by the contingent interaction of the above 
factors can be schematized in a three phase process:  
• The first phase was inaugurated with the 
“contagion effect” of the supra-nationalism 
discourse of pan-Arab nationalism (al-qawmiyya 
al-‘arabiyya) emanating from the regional 
exemplar of Egypt from 1952, which was 
amplified by the pan-regional reach of its radio 
station Sawt al-‘Arab (Voice of the Arabs) that 
attacked the monarchies of the region and 
promoted revolutionary republican forces. The 
ultimate aim of this ideology was to achieve Arab 
political unity within a singular sovereign 
republican state spanning the entire region. This 
revolutionary republican experiment was 
inaugurated with the founding in 1958 of the 
United Arab Republic (UAR) through the union of 
Egypt, Syria and incongruously Yemen’s 
Imamate.7  
• The second phase began after the failure of the 
UAR experiment in 1961, which led ‘Abd al-Nāṣir 
in 1963 to abandon the political goal of Arab 
territorial unity in one state in favor of Arab 
doctrinal unanimity among individual states [47, 
p. 1]. This engendered the local adaptation of the 
pan-regional ideology into the practice of a 
meso-nationalism to be enshrined in an 
independent state guided by a modern, secular 
and developmental creed. In Yemen this meso-
nationalism was introduced in the North by the 
1962 revolution that was driven by an “anti-
absolutist” discourse against a sectarian and 
feudal theocracy. And subsequently it was 
inaugurated in the South by the 1967 revolution 
                                            
7 In March 1958, Imam Aḥmad volunteered his ultra conservative 
Mutawakkillite Kingdom of North Yemen as a junior partner of the UAR, which 
was, as Ferris [4] puts it “the grandest pan-Arab experiment of the century”. 
Out of mutual political convenience the Egyptian President accepted the 
Imam’s offer and the UAR was renamed the United Arab States (UAS) and 
lasted until December 1961. The Imam’s primary motivation was to use the 
UAS as a security buffer against Saudi Arabia (see p. 33-34). 
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animated by a national liberation discourse 
against a Western colonial power. Unification in 
1990 failed to institutionalize a functioning 
modern state with an integrated national polity of 
equal citizens. The unified state chronic 
performance failures transformed the national 
polity into regional enclaves of political 
disaffection against it, which created a context 
for the re-emergence of centrifugal forces.  
• The third phase was triggered by the 1994 civil 
war, which was won by the northern regime. Its 
defining feature was the unified state’s failure to 
nurture a “horizontal comradeship” between it 
and the nation’s citizens, preferring instead to 
promote a “vertical clientship” with the 
representatives of selected groups. This 
subverted the development of affiliative 
sentiments among the national polity vis-à-vis 
the state, and instead generated the rise of sub-
national allegiances in the form of an infra-
nationalism: This entails the fracturing of the 
national polity into regional and/or communal 
social formations through a process of a reactive 
localization of political loyalties, as these sub-
national formations asserted their autonomy from 
the illegitimate central state. This engendered a 
default vernacular federalism characterized by 
the collective sharing of a unified national 
territory, while political identification is 
circumscribed to the regional and communal 
levels.  
Since unification nationalism in Yemen, which was 
opportunistically invoked as an occasional mobilizing 
slogan, partly in response to the permanent culture war 
with Saudi Arabia, lapsed into an “intermittent mood”. 
Indeed, nationalism did not offer an alternative 
narrative that was credible and nationally unifying and 
thus never supplanted the prevailing primordial 
rationales (e.g., tribalism, regionalism and 
confessionalism). Consequently, it failed as an 
ideological covenant to forge symbiotic relations 
between the individual, the community, the nation and 
the state; and thus did not serve as the reproductive 
means of the Yemeni nation-state. Furthermore, the 
perpetual interference of Saudi Arabia, which is, as 
Halliday [45] puts it, “the main national enemy of 
Yemen” (p. 35), forced the state to constantly counter 
its perverse influence, which distorted the articulation, if 
not forced the abandonment, of Yemeni nationalism 
from a future-oriented project of state-modernizing and 
nation-building, to a regressive project limited to tribes-
reliant regime protection and state-survival. Ultimately, 
this led to a national polity constituted by divergent 
identities, conflicting loyalties and competing 
sovereignties.  
3.3. Regional Contagion: Corporatist Imperative 
Modern state formation in Yemen was inaugurated 
through the gauntlet of its neighbors’ regional power 
politics, and evolved under their constant threats to its 
sovereignty as they sought either to reduce the Yemeni 
state to vassal status or to sabotage the novel 
experiment to become the only republic in the Arabian 
Peninsula. As one Saudi scholar [3] confessed in a rare 
moment of candor in a thoroughly partisan book: “by 
overthrowing the monarchy and setting up a republic, 
[Yemen] was an indirect negative influence which could 
affect Saudi stability because of the possible spillover 
effect caused by its example” (p. 50). In spite of 
external attempts to derail its republican experiment, 
Yemen was still “muddling through”, until recently, as 
the only multi-party democracy in the Arabian 
Peninsula, if merely nominally. State politics in Yemen 
was driven by a sense of urgency about a perennial 
existential threat as state leaders were compelled to 
shift policies between strategic resistance and tactical 
accommodation toward their wealthier and militarily 
more powerful neighbors.  
The modern and democratic state that was 
promised by the 1962 revolution and subsequently by 
the 1990 unification was achieved only in form but 
never became one in substance. State formation in 
Yemen was contingent on the political machinations of 
its neighboring states, in particular its two regional 
patrons, namely the Saudi Arabian monarchy and the 
Egyptian republic. Given the influence of these two 
regional hegemons, the regional context provides a 
more accurate comparative frame for the Yemeni state 
than through its comparative deficits vis-à-vis a fictional 
liberal regime favored by the Western hegemony 
sustaining foreign democracy promotion industry. 
Indeed, these regional regimes’ systemic features were 
reproduced in Yemen’s political system: The chronic 
patrimonialism within the inner circle of power; the 
endemic use of financial cooptation as the sole means 
of eliciting political allegiance; the military autocrat in 
civilian suit as President; the intrinsic tendency toward 
hereditary succession to power; and the national 
economy’s appropriation as the private fiefdom of the 
socio-political elite. Also, there is the feudalization of 
the state’s relational norms vis-à-vis the polity (e.g., the 
pervasiveness of patron-client relations), which is 
correlated to the enduring dysfunctions (as in Egypt), or 
ornamental presence (as in Saudi Arabia), of 
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representative institutions. One of the permanent 
politico-institutional consequences of this external 
political meddling and institutional grafting on the 
nature of the Yemeni state was the adoption of a 
corporatist mode of exercising power by the state. As 
Lapidus [48] explains, it is a political regime “where 
power is not an expression of the total society but the 
prerogative of certain individuals or groups [who 
govern] through networks of clients and retainers”  
(p. 364).  
Indeed, Amin and El Kenz [49] suggests that 
corporatist governance is a pan-regional historical 
legacy from what they call, the tradition of “mameluke 
power”, which entails “a complex system that 
associated the personalized power of warlords, 
businessmen and men of religion” (p. 3). This type of 
power shares three features: (1) the supreme authority 
of military institutions; (2) the interpenetration of the 
business world and the world of power that effaces the 
existence of a genuine private sector; and (3) the 
reliance on traditional conservative religious legitimacy 
(p. 9-10). Accordingly, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are both 
corporatist regimes that administered their polities 
through paternalist ministrations and dispossessed 
them of political agency. Saudi Arabia is ruled through 
a “monarchic corporatism” institutionalized in a state as 
the private dominion of the hereditary rule of a tribal 
dynasty and its retinue of genealogically linked family 
lineages, which is underpinned by a carbon rent 
producing economy that finances the cooptation of a 
politically neutered polity. Legitimacy is invested in the 
authenticity of rulers’ genealogical pedigree, and 
sovereignty is the exclusive privilege of the ruling family 
and its retinue of princes. All of which are veneered by 
the imprimatur of Islam. In contrast, Egypt is under the 
rule of an “oligarchic corporatism” controlled by a 
military bureaucracy in collusion with a motley 
comprador bourgeoisie that monopolize the economy 
while the population is pacified through government 
subsidies. Legitimacy is conferred through ritualistic 
elections of military strongmen who assume the 
paternalistic mantle of father of the nation and arrogate 
sovereignty on behalf of an intimidated population of 
adolescent citizens.  
In Yemen, the state evolved into a “cabalistic 
corporatism” based on a consociation of venal retainers 
selected from key social categories (e.g., tribal, 
business, merchants, regional, military, confessional 
and notable families, etc.) on the basis of their high 
political threat potential among other assets. 
Collectively, they constituted a macro-parasitical class, 
who appropriated the state’s institutional apparatus as 
a convenient bargaining venue to negotiate the 
allocation of the nation’s resources among themselves 
under the tutelage of the head of state.8 This initially 
rural-dominated consociation emerged with the 
inauguration of the ‘Alī ‘Abdāllah Ṣāliḥ regime in 1978, 
whose political mobilization strategy was to allocate 
privileged access to state resources to the leadership 
of selected groups. Its institutional entrenchment began 
in the 1980s when carbon rent became available, and 
was fully operational in the late 1990s when the 
country’s economy was transformed into their 
predatory domain. Consequently, the state was 
permanently organized around informal power 
networks operating in para-institutional enclaves 
wherein the politics of cooptation through government 
largesse prevailed. These informal enclaves 
systematically overruled the formal institutional 
channels of the public bureaucracy that mediated state-
society relations, which operationalized the national 
political culture into a perverse combination of 
patronage and clientelism.  
This led to the consolidation of a corporatist socio-
political order in which there was no competent 
nationalist bourgeoisie endowed with the ideological 
resources to establish their class hegemony over the 
national polity and invest the state’s authority with 
popular legitimacy. Instead, there was a corporatist 
elite of a mostly rural pedigree insulated within 
primordial sensibilities and parochial allegiances 
exercising a consociational domination over the 
national polity. In effect, this corporatist elite is the 
state’s privileged, if not exclusive, constituency, at it 
occupies an intermediary stratum between the state 
and the national polity and performs most of the 
mediating functions: Representation, mobilization, 
repression and extraction. Such a context was 
unpropitious to the politics of nationalism and its 
prerequisites of national polity formation and integration 
on the basis of social and institutional modernization. 
Instead, what prevailed in the aftermath of the 1970s 
was the construction of a post-revolution national 
identity based on a state-sponsored politics of cultural 
authenticity that was partly a reaction to Saudi Arabia’s 
unrelenting subversive practices: Political interference, 
cultural condescension, economic baiting of segments 
of the polity and financial cooptation of the Yemeni 
                                            
8 According to Hill et al. [50], “Around 10 key families and business groups 
with close ties to the president control more than 80 per cent of imports, 
manufacturing, processing, banking, telecommunications and the transport of 
goods” (p. x).  
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state. However, this politics adopted an impoverished 
version of the Qaḥṭān Saga’s discursive tradition 
through the state’s instrumentalization of a set of 
traditional cultural practices (e.g., qāt chewing and 
tribal-related sartorial and recreational customs) as the 
foundation of social cohesion, national identity and 
state legitimacy [35].  
3.4. Segmented Nation: Dividing the Polity 
This corporatist socio-political order entailed the 
political disenfranchisement of significant segments of 
the non-tribal population, especially urban youth, 
women and others lacking political threat capital. This 
relegated a substantial proportion of the population into 
regional enclaves and communal fiefs under the 
political influence of non-state actors; hence the 
persistent segregation of the national polity into 
divergent sociocultural geographies based on a social 
organizational ethos differentiated along a rural-urban 
divide. 
This peculiar rural-urban divide resulted from the 
fact that the Yemeni state never achieved unitary 
sovereignty over the national polity and territory, but 
instituted instead a shared sovereignty with regional 
tribal shaykhs over their rural domains and the state 
assumed sovereignty over urban areas and rendered 
permanent the divergence in their respective 
organizational ethos. This led to the recurrent re-
production of a tribal polity through differentiated norms 
of political socialization and civic practices, which 
sustained the self-exclusion of tribes from full 
participation in a modern urban-based civil society. 
Instead, this tribal polity formed its own rural-based 
“civil society” through ascriptive membership – not on 
elective criteria as in the urban sector – which is 
characterized by primordial loyalties circumscribed to a 
kinship-bounded radius of social trust and cooperation. 
Moreover, shaykhs assume their traditional leadership 
role through hereditary succession and not through 
election or meritocratic considerations as is the (not 
always respected) norm in modern civil society. 
Furthermore, while the tribes’ primordial boundaries 
(territorial and genealogical) promote an intra-
communal cooperative ethos, they also nurture a fierce 
parochialism, which engenders a reflexive antagonism 
toward outsiders that is not conducive to sustaining the 
value of social tolerance (ideally) associated with civil 
society. Although tribes have elaborate rules for conflict 
resolution based on “tribal customs” (al-‘urf al-qabalī) 
within and between tribal polities, such rules are not 
transferrable to an urban context regulated by modern 
judicial practice (qānūn). Also, there is the divergence 
in cultural ethos: Tribes are rural guardians of ancestral 
traditions pre-dating state formation, and not modern 
citizens upholding a civic culture within the state. Given 
this set of particularities, Carapico [51, p. 323-5] 
suggested that civil society be categorized differently in 
terms of its domains of intervention and its primary 
social agents: In the rural areas the type of self-help 
community activism is best described as al‑mujtama’ 
al‑ahlī (primordial affiliations-based civil society) that is 
initiated by agrarian actors with locally raised funds or 
remittances;9 while in the modernizing urban areas it 
could be described as al‑mujtama’ al‑madanī (citizens’ 
rights-driven civil society) and is led by middle class 
change agents who are dependent on foreign funding. 
The resulting spatially-based divergences in social 
practices and political organization are not due to the 
intrinsic cultural inertia ascribed to traditional polities, 
but the result of the state’s chronic neglect of rural 
development, which dissuaded rural population from 
abandoning their traditions of mediation and self-help 
between primary associations (i.e., families, tribes, and 
villages). Indeed, the persistence of this rural-urban 
division is partly a consequence of the state’s initial 
administrative weakness that led to the relegation of its 
authority to primordial leadership. The initial 
administrative weakness of existing state institutions 
was subsequently replaced by a largely dysfunctional 
bureaucracy devoid of effective service delivery 
capacity, which consolidated rural residents’ sentiment 
of passive state avoidance into active state rejection 
[55]. The ultimate legacy was the consolidation of a 
hybrid national polity based on a rural majority of tribal 
members and an urban minority of state citizens. This 
hybrid polity was left to fester as the state’s deliberate 
evisceration of modern institutions of intermediation 
(e.g., local councils, civil society organizations, etc.) to 
                                            
9 These rural civil society organizations were epitomized in the Local 
Development Associations (LDAs), which began in 1963 on the basis of 
remittances from rural émigrés to Saudi Arabia. They consolidated the rural 
areas’ political sovereignty, and institutional independence from the state, and 
thus indirectly challenged the state’s economic relevance (see phase 2 in 
Table 1). Different regimes have sought to coopt their economic independence 
and political autonomy [27, p. 57-74]. In the 1980s, the Ṣāliḥ regime enacted a 
series of laws and decrees that coopted the LDAs’ “civic activism” by merging 
them with local administration into “Local Council for Cooperative 
Development” – the precursors of today’s Local Councils. In effect, this 
transformed an autonomous community cooperative movement into a 
“corporatist project of the state” (see [52, 53]). Their demise was occasioned by 
the 1990 Gulf war, which led to the expulsion of Yemenis and the end of 
remittances (see phase three in Table 1). These rural civil societies were 
replaced by urban-based NGOs largely dependent on international donors (see 
[54]).  
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sustain its power, ultimately prevented the formation of 
a politically and socially integrated modern national 
polity. 
This rural-urban spatial divide was replicated into a 
north-south geopolitical rift following unification in 1990 
through the transfer of the north’s primordial federalist 
socio-political order to the south. As Halliday [45] 
observed “Unity was… not a policy aimed at fusion but 
an instrument for inter-regime competition” (p. 38). The 
end result was the civil war of 1994, in which the north 
prevailed “by making significant concessions to the 
centrifugal forces”: namely the main northern tribes and 
their militias, the army and Sunni Islamists who were 
agents of traditionalism. As al-Saqqaf [29] noted, 
unification was a political opportunity for the “renewal 
and expansion of traditionalism” throughout the 
southern territories (p. 100). Accordingly, they spread 
their consociational domination to the south along with 
their tradition-enforcing practices. Some of the effects 
include: (a) the de-cosmopolitanization of the urban 
milieu, especially ‘Aden, through the prohibition of 
modern forms of entertainment (e.g., the closure of 
cinemas, the destruction of a beer factory, etc.,); (b) the 
promotion of qāt chewing as the hegemonic leisure 
activity and as the means of an assimilationist strategy 
to induce the cultural homogenization of the southern 
polity and expand the economic interests of the 
northern tribal qāt lords;10 (c) the Islamization of the 
public sphere through the segregation of the sexes, the 
enforcement of Islamic dress code for women, and the 
abrogation of liberal laws concerning women’s rights; 
(d) the retribalization of the southern polity through the 
reinstatement of the tribal shaykh as the dominant 
communal authority figure and institution of local 
governance; and (e) the balkanization of the southern 
economy among the tribal-military-business cabal of 
the northern regime. These measures were 
compounded by the political exactions against, and 
material dispossession of, southerners, whose status 
as citizens was reduced to an unfulfilled aspiration. The 
result was the persistence of socio-political wounds 
                                            
10 These tribal qāt lords constitute an indispensable pillar of the cabalistic 
state as the commodity they sell structures the functioning of the social order, 
and regulates the quotidian existence of the population. Qāt’s mode of 
consumption through the collective chewing session has reduced the national 
polity into the voluntary inmates of a social panopticon under the shared 
supervision of the state and tribal qāt lords (see [35]). Moreover, they are part 
of the 9 per cent of landlords who own 65 per cent of Yemen’s cultivated land 
area and produce 64 per cent of the country’s total qāt production (see [56]).  
that have never healed and were ultimately manifested 
into the demand for regional secession.11 
Since then a Yemeni national identity has remained 
an unevenly shared symbolic property among the 
nation’s regionally sundered polity. Indeed, the 
prevailing public concern is no longer about affirming 
the shared identity implied in the nation and state 
relationality, but about renegotiating the political 
relationship between the polity and the state. 
3.5. State Existential Practices: Regime 
Maintenance  
The legacy of the above processes was the 
saddling of the state with a litany of deficiencies: The 
non-availability of nationalism as a mobilization 
ideology, the persistence of centrifugal regional political 
forces against the unitary state, and the antagonistic 
demographic, cultural and geographic segmentation of 
the national polity. These compelled the state to resort 
to opportunistic regime maintenance strategies, among 
which two are worthy of note: 
The first was the adoption of what I call the state’s 
existential politics, or alternatively as Migdal [58] calls 
it, the “politics of survival” (p. 206-237). The latter term 
is widely used to describe Yemeni state politics, but it is 
not historically contextualized and rarely operationally 
defined in the Yemeni context. It refers to the state 
leadership’s chronic recourse to an ensemble of 
tactical maneuvers aimed exclusively at regime 
maintenance in a political environment characterized 
by the “fragmentation of social control” between the 
state, its venal retainers (the principal ones being tribal 
shaykhs and their regional militias) and a politically 
indifferent population that is conditionally amenable to 
political mobilization through the state’s episodic mass 
clientelism. This political situation in which important 
segments of the polity are unreliable supporters of the 
state led to a chronic paranoia among state power 
holders. This engendered a governance modality 
based on a pathological relationship between state and 
society that was manifested as follows: The permanent 
alteration of the priorities of state leaders from 
improving the polity’s well-being to an exclusive 
concern with regime maintenance through elite 
                                            
11 The final report of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) [57] 
contains a “consensual vision on the roots and contents on the Southern 
issue”. It inventories the grievances of the southern polity vis-à-vis the north 
along four dimensions: political, legal and rights, economic and socio-cultural 
(see p. 30-36).  
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collusion; a style of state decision-making driven by 
constant short term tactical maneuverings to placate 
potential adversaries; the deliberate establishment of 
overlapping agencies with redundant functions and the 
recurrent shuffling of state agencies’ leadership to 
prevent the emergence of alternative power centers to 
the state’s executive branch; lax public sector 
supervision and control from above, leaving public 
servants free to use state resources for private ends; 
the preemptive de-institutionalization of the formal state 
through the deliberate weakening of the public 
administration’s implementation capacity by means of 
the strategic use of non-merit-based appointment 
through the deliberate reliance on arbitrary criteria 
(e.g., political loyalty, relative incompetence and 
corrupt reputation) to select office holders; the tactical 
disabling of the human development institutions (e.g., 
all aspects and stages of the educational system) 
through regulatory neglect, funding deficit and 
intentional selection of inadequate management staff 
as a means of impairing their proper functioning and 
thus limiting the population’s aspirational horizon; 
chronic absence of a commitment to institution-building 
beyond their formal establishment that leads to the 
perfunctory institutional processing of the nation’s 
population with minimal improvement in its well-being; 
and policy-making and/or problem-solving was prey to 
an endemic strategic paralysis due to an intrinsic 
contradiction between the executive branch’s advisers’ 
political imperative of maintaining the regime in power, 
and the line ministries’ technocrats’ policy priority of 
addressing the nation’s massive development deficit.  
The second was the institutionalization of the 
principle of subsidiarity as a center-periphery 
governance strategy. The first use of the subsidiarity 
principle was by necessity in the aftermath of the 1962 
revolution given the state’s administrative weakness. 
Subsequently, during the 1980s it became de facto 
state policy that was tactically deployed as the state 
weaned itself from its fiscal dependency on the rural 
population due to the availability of carbon rent. By the 
1990s, the state’s complete fiscal autonomy from the 
population was consolidated into the strategy of 
monopolizing control of the center and resource-rich 
parts of the periphery while authority over the rest was 
shared with, if not relegated to, regional primordial 
elites. In practice, the subsidiarity principle is a tactical 
decentralization of power through the establishment of 
a vertical relationship between the state and regional 
tribal fiefdoms. In effect, the state abdicates its 
responsibility toward the majority of the national polity 
through shared territorial managerial responsibility with 
elite corporate groups. It exemplifies a form of indirect 
rule by the Yemeni state, as local authority is delegated 
to traditional elites, which entrenches primordial rule 
and feudal privileges in the rural areas. Consequently, 
subsidiarity entails a set of organizing principles that 
configures asymmetric relations between the state and 
the national polity: (a) the articulation of state-society 
relations around the hierarchical ranking of the polity’s 
constituent groups based on their political threat level 
to the state; (b) the maintenance of political stability 
and loyalty through the delegation of authority to 
geographically bounded regions or sub-regions under 
the political control of state-funded shaykhs, or under 
the surveillance of a military division and social policing 
of a sectarian group (e.g., the Salafists in the northern 
Zaydī stronghold of Ṣa‘ada province); (c) the 
cartelization of power through the establishment of 
shadow parastatal structures as an architecture of 
governance that privileges social groups with high 
threat quotient and substitutes elite reciprocity for 
public accountability; (d) the tactical relegation of the 
formal state to a subordinate managerial entity saddled 
with functionally disabled ministries, while national 
affairs are actually managed by the patrimonial core of 
the shadow state in coordination with its cartel of 
clients; and (e) the permanent institutionalization of the 
stipendiary regime served as a means of financing this 
selective decentralization arrangement and as a rural 
redistribution scheme for social welfare of the included 
tribal constituencies. 
 The institutional ecology created by the state’s 
regime maintenance practices was not conducive to 
the proper institutionalization of electoral politics when 
the 1970 ban on the formation of political parties was 
lifted in 1990. Indeed, it inaugurated the shift from elite 
patronage to mass clientelism. The example was set 
with the initial establishment of the General People’s 
Congress (GPC) in 1982 and its subsequent 
consolidation into the ruling political party after 
unification into a “clientelistic party” that bribed its 
political supporters, and never made the transition onto 
a “programmatic party” that promotes social programs 
for the provision of public goods [59, p. 87-8]. Other 
political parties (with the partial exception of the 
Islamist party al-Iṣlāḥ, which used charitable activities 
to foster political support) adopted the practice of 
bribing political supporters to level the playing field. 
Moreover, they had to negotiate their existence with the 
state and to submit to its rulebook of negotiated 
cooptation. Indeed, electoral politics were driven by an 
opportunistic alternation among oppositional parties 
between contestation and accommodation to the state. 
Accordingly, elections were reduced to a mechanism 
for elite entrenchment not democracy enhancement 
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and all political actors capitulated to “the politics of 
positional change and not structural reform” [60, p. 80]. 
As a result, change of the societal and political status 
quo was impervious to elections, and politics as a 
public discourse was emptied of its residual credibility 
and accountability.  
These practices became an integral part of the 
state’s institutional mechanism and ultimately 
transformed the country into a libertarian dystopia: That 
is, a social order without formal regulatory institutions, 
lacking third party legal protection given the absence of 
an independent judiciary, and guided by a socially 
extreme laissez-faire ethos that delegates the 
management of citizens’ interaction to traditional 
communal authorities. This societal arrangement 
engendered an administrative culture labelled “northern 
anarchy” (al-fawḍā al-shimālī), which is characterized 
by a state bureaucracy that is merely a patronage 
distribution mechanism devoid of any developmental 
compass, and that selectively co-opt the society’s elites 
into its service on a rotating basis contingent on the 
political urgency of the moment [39]. Consequently, this 
established by default an anarchic mechanism for 
regime change, which operated as follows: The state 
concedes authority to tribal shaykhs over their regional 
fiefdoms while it foments competition between them as 
a means of containment, which sustains the latent 
centrifugal tendencies within the national polity. In this 
way, these potential political contenders for state power 
are constantly preoccupied with ensuring the security 
of their tribal fiefdoms to challenge the center. 
However, when the center can no longer contain these 
peripheral forces (either militarily or through bribes) the 
result is the takeover of the state by a regional tribal 
militia, as happened on 21 September 2014 when the 
Ḥūthīs took over Ṣana‘ā’. 
3.6. Governance Culture: Venal Polity Reproduction 
The culture of governance is constituted by the 
cumulative institutional effects of the practices 
discussed above: The political elite’s self-serving use of 
a nationalist discourse, the chronic absence of an 
effective strategy for national subject formation and 
territorial integration, the mass exclusion of citizens by 
the state’s elite-centric policy regime, the marginalizing 
administrative practices towards regions and 
communities, and the inequitable and polarizing 
selective patronage and occasional clientelist political 
practices, which were exacerbated by external political 
and economic interventions. The resulting governance 
culture never operationalized symbiotic relations 
between the state and its citizens. Instead, it had 
corrosive effects on citizens’ behavioral ethos: It 
undermined their affiliative sentiment toward the nation-
state; constrained their political agency within the 
public sphere; weakened their civic disposition towards 
fellow citizens; limited the scope of their civic 
engagement; and diminished their attachment to a 
national identity. This governance culture led to the 
corruption of public values as manifested in the 
endemic accommodation to state-society relations 
characterized by a pervasive transactional ethos and 
the corollary submission to the state’s political 
cooptation and inducement to self-entrapment through 
acts of petty corruption.  
Indeed, the regime’s compulsive “opportunistic 
patronage” of the polity engendered a decentralization 
of corruption from an elite-exclusive practice to its 
generalization into a mass-inclusive culture. This 
generated a malignant synergy between a cabalistic 
state and a venal polity through the proliferation of 
venal mechanisms of mediation that promoted a culture 
of corruption, which permeated the entire 
administrative apparatus of the state and spread 
throughout society. Indeed, the state actively fomented 
a venal polity as its self-reproduction mechanism 
through normalizing corruption into an irresistible social 
gravitational force: (a) by condoning elites’ use of the 
state as a public means to private ends; (b) by inducing 
citizens, by means of elite exemplification, to 
appreciate corruption as an essential means to social 
mobility; and (c) by normalizing the public’s expectation 
of payment for the performance of their civic duties. 
This is confirmed by the fact that in 2016 Yemen was 
ranked 170 out of 176 countries in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index. In the 
MENA region, Yemen “has the highest bribery rate, 
with nearly four in five public service users paying a 
bribe (77 per cent)” [61, p. 31]. 12 This culture of 
corruption’s operational norms have entangled the 
national polity within a complex web of venal practices, 
which have become the normal means for (a) 
accessing public services as an ordinary citizen, (b) 
performing work-related tasks as a civil servant, or (c) 
asserting one’s political agency as a member of civil 
society.13 The ethical challenges and agential 
                                            
12 According to the Transparency International report [61], Yemeni citizens’ 
“perception of corruption by actors” in ten institutional sectors is 
overwhelmingly negative: Prime Minister’s office (49%), parliament (77%), 
government officials (79%), local councilors (51%), police (74%), tax (83%), 
judges (60%), traditional leaders (68%), religious leaders (16%), and business 
executives (37%) (p. 30, 33). 
13 The public’s complicity with the state’s culture of corruption is not due to 
the lack of “awareness of citizens about their rights and the legal framework to 
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dilemmas associated with these three roles are briefly 
illustrated below. 
First, ordinary citizens are confronted with the 
prevalence of personal mediation in interacting with the 
state that invalidates the notion of its obligations vis-à-
vis citizens, as it takes the form of a supplicant 
relational protocol, (i.e., favor-seeking and bestowing) 
between citizens and bureaucrats in government 
institutions. Such a relationship is transacted through 
the following practices: The baghshīsh syndrome, 
which is a generalized system of citizen harassment 
through petty bribes seeking, taking and giving, in 
which government service delivery entails a conditional 
quid pro quo involving cash payments to civil servants. 
And the other is the wāsṭa system (an endemic Middle 
Eastern practice), which citizens must resort to when 
petitioning for a public good that entails the obligatory 
intercession of a socio-politically connected third party 
(as political philanthropist) to enhance their chances. 
This confirms the relational axiom within the corporatist 
state: “individuals… do not interact with the state 
directly, but through intermediaries” [62, p. 184].  
Second, civil servants, perhaps animated by 
economic necessity or engaged in elite emulation, are 
entirely motivated by a pecuniary ethos. This has a 
corrupting effects on their work ethic as they expect to 
be compensated regardless of performance. This is 
evident in the fact that “around a third of all public 
sector workers are ghosts, that is, they do not turn up 
for work, but draw pay” [63, p. 24]. Moreover, the 
introduction of an incentive system (al-mukāfāat wa al-
ḥawāfiz) within the civil service law that sought initially 
to improve the performance of civil servants, has 
deteriorated into an entitlement system that serves the 
state’s cooptation strategy. This contaminates the 
value framework of the public sphere by discouraging 
virtuous behavior among public servants, corroding the 
moral content of government action, and fraying the 
nation’s ethical seams. 14  
                                                                          
fight corruption”, but because of the pervasive coercive situational imperatives 
they confront when working in, or interacting with, state institutions. This 
suggests that the widespread belief that “ordinary people can make a 
difference in the fight against corruption” is merely a comforting delusion given 
that the leadership of national institutions are the main corruption enablers. 
14 In this context, even the salary paid to civil servants is a form of 
patronage similar to the stipend paid to tribes. This is illustrated in the fact that 
the government’s wage bill for the 1.25 million civil servants (and their 
estimated 6.9 million dependents, which together makes up 30 percent of the 
Third, members of civil society in their quest to 
exercise their socio-political agency are subjected to 
cooptation pressures from the three main funding 
sources: From the government through its sponsorship 
of civil society organizations (CSOs) in order to turn 
them into proxy mechanisms for citizen cooptation and 
voter mobilization. The same tactic is employed by the 
main opposition party (al-Iṣlāḥ) through the guise of 
charitable works. Also, UN agencies and Western 
governments have subordinated CSOs’ agency to that 
of mere sub-contractors for their political liberalization 
schemes and development projects. This partly 
explains the surge in the establishment of these 
organizations throughout the country: From 424 in 
1989 to 12,317 in 2012 [54, p. 11]. As a survival 
strategy most, if not all, CSOs in Yemen have become 
willing clients imbued with a mercenary ethos on behalf 
of the above parties’ interests.15 
In sum, the previous sub-sections analyzed the 
contingent combination of historical factors and social 
forces embedded in local and regional processes that 
fashioned the constitution of Yemen’s political system 
into a hybrid of endemic elite patronage and episodic 
mass clientelism. This political system is the legacy of 
a path-dependent process that resulted from state 
policy decisions made in response to socio-political 
challenges that have sedimented into patterns of 
institutional arrangements and of state governance 
practices. In turn, these have circumscribed the 
society’s historical trajectory, determined its state-
building strategy and its polity formation process, as 
well as influenced citizens’ political subjectivity and 
agency. All of this culminated in the contemporary 
Yemeni state that I called a cabalistic corporatist state, 
which dissolved national affiliative sentiment into 
regional and communal ones and bequeathed a 
minimally shared national identification among the 
citizenry.  
Table 2 categorizes the components that articulate 
the immanent logic of the cabalistic corporatist state. 16 
It presents a paradigmatic description of the nature of 
                                                                          
total population) amounts to 65 billion Yemeni Rials a month [64]. This sum 
amounts to 31 percent of the state’s budget and to over 11 percent of GDP [65, 
p. 6 and 144]. 
15 This is corroborated by a survey that found “Approximately 50% of 
respondents believe… the CSOs are only a means to obtain money from 
foreign institutions” [66, p. 26]. 
16 The table is based on my long-term experience in Yemen as a United 
Nations staff, resident scholar and a critical engagement with the following 
works: [26, 50, 59, 67, 68]. 
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this state’s structural logic and operational norms that 
underpin its governance practices. The demise of this 
state, as captured in the slogan al-sha‘ab yurīd āsqaṭ 
al-nidhām (“the people want the fall of the system”), 
was the motivating aspiration for Yemen’s Arab Spring. 
Paradoxically, the beneficiaries of this state (e.g., 
leaders of regime-embedded political parties and their 
recruits) were the majority members of the National 
Dialogue Conference tasked with hammering out a 
vision for a “New Yemen”. Again, the process ended in 
premature failure as was the case in the 1962 and 
1990 attempts at nation-state building. This is 
discussed in the last section.  
 
Table 2: Yemen’s Cabalistic Corporatist State 
Norms, Structure and Practices 
The state’s infrastructural constitution is described below along four dimensions that make-up its culture of governance. First, under the 
rubric of “governance norms” the state’s operational modality is inventoried in terms of six aspects that collectively define and structure state 
relations with the national polity. Second, the term “selection criteria” refers to the individual or group assets prioritized by the state in 
allocating patronage privileges. Third, “membership categories” is the classification of the polity according to their social make up and political 
functions in the cabalistic state. And fourth, the domains of patronage and clientelism identify the key sectors and the beneficiaries of what I 
call the hybrid regime of elite patronage and mass clientelism.  
Governance Norms: Polity Regimentation 
▪ Political Culture: State politics is based on a national polity co-
optation strategy organized around selective elite patronage through 
rent distribution and/or extraction and episodic mass clientelism (i.e., 
votes-buying during elections), which veneers the state’s political 
legitimacy. Political stability is obtained through the financial co-
optation of national/communal elites, instead of political bargaining 
with their constituencies. As a rule, elite grafting is ignored while mass 
poaching of state resources is tolerated as a means of entrapping the 
state-orphaned polity into a culture of corruption. The latter perverts 
the citizenry’s civic sensibility through its involuntary complicity with 
the state’s predatory practices.  
▪ Administrative Ethos: There is no separation between politics and 
administration as the shadow state dictates the managerial functions 
of the formal state’s administrative agencies. For example: the 
executive branch selectively delegates state functions to primordial 
regional actors; the judiciary auctions justice to the highest bidder; the 
legislature is a venue for bargaining over the preferences of the 
executive and the personal interests of legislators; the bureaucracy’s 
primary function is to serve as a salary distribution apparatus; the 
ministries are institutionally unable to address societal challenges, 
and thus ministers attend to administrative routines and ceremonial 
functions, as their ultimate role is to serve as the institutional alibi of 
the shadow state.  
▪ Structural Exclusion: The differential privileging of societal groups 
and the asymmetric distribution of state resources engendered the 
structural exclusion of the mass of ordinary citizens. Their fate is 
relegated to the haphazard attention of marginal local/regional state-
appointed bureaucrats and the opportunistic leadership of tribal 
shaykhs. The majority of the polity is denied substantive participation 
in the elite-centric mechanisms of decision-making over the nation’s 
fate. This exclusion is relieved by the regime’s mass clientelism 
strategy (a) through perfunctory participation in elections induced by 
cash distribution; and (b) through haphazard welfare initiatives by the 
state bureaucracy such as the state’s food and fuel subsidies, and 
occasional recruitment as state employees.  
▪ Institutional Ecology: The state’s institutional architecture and 
operational logic suffer from an intrinsic structural asymmetry. This 
is established in a bifurcation between the government (al-ḥukūma), 
which represents the visible state apparatus made up of appointed 
cadres, and the power (al-sulṭa), which is the shadow state 
constituted by members of the patrimonial elite (see below) who 
control everything. Consequently, the institutional ecology is 
fractured into endemic antinomies of governance: nation vs. state, 
formal state vs. shadow state, power elite vs. government elite, 
elites vs. ordinary citizens, executive branch vs. line ministries, 
center vs. regions, institutions vs. society.  
▪ Social Mobilization: In the absence of any viable political 
ideology to harness the public’s support, the regime resorts to the 
segmentation of the polity into groups according to their degree of 
political relevance or threat potential. This is pursued through (a) 
the contingent hierarchization of societal groups and their 
organization into a series of discrete silos of vertical power 
relationships that ensure mutual loyalty and dependency on the 
President and his patrimonial entourage as well as structure these 
groups’ competition over rent allocations; and (b) recourse to 
shared governance with regional actors through the strategic use of 
the principle of subsidiarity to selectively delegate power (see text).  
▪ Political Financing: To sustain its political stability the regime 
pursues a three-prong political financing strategy: (a) the 
establishment of rent distribution networks, which circulate “carbon 
rent” among an exclusive group of potential political challengers as 
a means of their cooptation; (b) the sponsorship of an economic 
elite (crony capitalist class) as a means of piggy-backing on their 
wealth-creation activities through compulsory partnerships or “fiscal 
contracts” with next of kin of the head of state or their allies; and (c) 
the mobilization of “aid rent” from the international community (i.e., 
UN agencies and bilateral donors) as the exclusive funding source 
of “development” projects, which employ and thus depoliticize the 
foreign educated upper middle class.  
Selection Criteria: Elite Constitution 
▪ Mobilization Capital: Possession of significant political influence 
over different segments of the polity, but especially over rural 
constituencies given the predominantly rural location of the national 
polity.  
▪ Strategic Assets: Embodied capital in targeted societal actors 
that the state uses for its contingent purposes: e.g., symbolic 
capital, international reputation, familial status, business skills, etc.  
▪ High Threat Quotient: Groups endowed with the potential to 
threaten the regime’s hold on power in an endemically conflict prone 
socio-political context due to the absence of state monopoly over the 
use of arms. They are co-opted through paid “protection pacts” with 
the regime. 
▪ Domestic Balance of Power Capability: Potential to contribute 
toward stability or instability, when requested by the regime, within 
the state-managed, but intrinsically unstable, coalitional politics of 
competing factions and regions. 
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Membership Categories: Demographic Ranking 
▪ Patrimonial Core: Exclusive network of the head of state’s 
immediate and extended family members (most with military 
background) and tribal associates, who are allocated the most 
strategic posts in the political, military, security and economic sectors. 
The members of this tribal-military-business network constitute the 
corporatist cabal that runs the “shadow state”, and is the ultimate 
repository of power in Yemen. 
▪ National/Regional Elites: Opportunistic assemblage of merchants, 
large landowners, bankers, and industrialists whose material assets, 
economic know-how and political vulnerability can be manipulated to 
induce collaboration with patrimonial core members. Also included, 
are the dynastic political and tribal families who are conferred political 
entitlements as ministers, advisers, etc. 
▪ Rural/Communal Leaders: Primarily tribal shaykhs whose 
“oligopoly of mobilizational capability” over the rural polity forces the 
state to rely on them for control of the rural population as well as its 
mobilization on behalf of the regime when needed in situation of 
conflict or during elections.  
▪ Urban Middle Classes: Composed of educated professionals 
who staff the state bureaucracy; religious scholars that could issue 
regime-friendly fatwas; secular intellectuals who supply journalistic 
defense of the regime. They constitute the clientelist stratum that 
provides the symbolic resources to prop-up the regime’s legitimacy 
deficit, and they substitute for the regime’s need of popular support. 
There is a minority within the middle classes that include the 
political dissenters: journalists, writers, activists, and CSOs. The 
latter are readily instrumentalized as state-sponsored partners in 
charitable activities, or as foreign-funded agents of political 
liberalization, which undermines their institutional consolidation into 
legitimate counter-status quo political actors. 
▪ Marginalized Groups: All those whose “threat quotient” is 
perceived by the state as low or non-existent. They include: the 
rural and urban poor, ethno-linguistic minorities, women, students, 
and above all the youths who constitute the majority of the national 
polity. 
Patronage and Clientelism Domains: Kleptocratic Redistribution 
▪ Military/Security Apparatus: Exclusive recruitment from kinsmen 
of patrimonial core and related tribes for the officer corps of all the 
branches of the military and security services; rural recruitment of foot 
soldiers as an employment scheme for ordinary tribesmen who serve 
as regime’s rural voters bank. 
▪ Private Sector: Allocation of sectoral monopolies, and exclusive 
licenses for import of specific commodities and the provision of certain 
services; granting privileged access to loans from government-linked 
banks; selective distribution of tax-exemption privileges and 
government contracts for public works, etc. These transactions have 
reduced the national economy into a rent extraction niche. 
▪ Public Sector: Job bank for middle classes in cities and 
provincial towns, who serve as neutral buffer in urban politics by 
being legally mandated to stay out of partisan politics, and as a 
captured electorate for the ruling party. They constitute a reservoir 
of guaranteed supporters during elections. 
▪ Politics: Proportional distribution of offices to representatives of 
corporatist factions; opposition political parties are constrained to 
negotiate a strategic collusion or tactical alliance with the state’s 
ruling party; and competitive votes-buying, or political bribery, is the 
primary means of inducing the citizenry’s civic engagement. 
 
4. TRANSITION: DEVOLVING THE STATE AND 
REGIONALIZING THE NATION 
The cumulative impact of the state’s existential 
politics that benefitted the elite segment of society was 
the undermining of the consolidation among the 
national polity of a shared sense of collective belonging 
to a unitary nation-state. This endemic belonging deficit 
was exacerbated by the regime’s power-maintenance 
strategy through the systematic pursuit of short-term 
tactical advantage at the expense of the national 
polity’s cohesion. The end-result was the chronic socio-
economic disenfranchisement of non-elite groups, and 
the permanent political marginalization of some regions 
of the country, which sundered the nation into an 
archipelago of politically alienated regional enclaves. In 
such a context, democracy atrophied into a procedural 
ritual (periodic elections and popular suffrage) and 
never fulfilled its substantive promises (freedom of 
political agency and enhanced well-being). The case of 
Yemen suggests a political axiom: Nation formation is 
contingent on an enabling state formation process. 
Indeed, the Yemeni state, initially by default and 
subsequently by design, provided a disabling 
environment for its own institutional development. This 
contributed to its failure to constitute a national polity 
based on equal citizenship, which undermined its 
legitimacy and engendered an ambiguous loyalty 
toward it as manifested in the widespread demand for 
regional autonomy. In effect, the Yemeni state never 
institutionalized the nation and never integrated its 
regional formations; and thereby condemned national 
polity members into straddling incompatible political 
identities and agencies: Citizens of a republic, or 
tribesmen of separate regional shaykhdoms. 
Consequently, the contemporary political situation is 
one characterized by persistent tribalism, endemic 
regionalism, and resurgent sectarianism. Indeed, 
Yemen is in the throes of a transition process of 
uncertain destination. Below, I describe the forces that 
initiated the transition and their effects, before 
discussing the failed attempt at bringing it to a closure. 
4.1. Yemen’s Arab Spring: Centrifugal Forces 
Unleashed 
The alienated political relationship between citizens 
and the state, which is the legacy of over a generation 
long experience of misgovernment, provided the 
catalyst to Yemen’s Arab Spring. The latter is the 
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umbrella term used for a triad of simultaneous rebellion 
that inaugurated the implosion of the cabalistic 
corporatist state:  
• Shabāb al-Thawra: The emancipatory social 
movement of Yemeni youths whose “revolution” 
was catalyzed by the Tunisian example, but was 
locally animated by their chronic exclusion from 
the state’s policy considerations and whose 
future under the regime promised permanent 
social exclusion and economic marginalization 
[69]. 
• Al-Ḥirāk al-Janūbī: The southern separatist 
movement, which started as a quest for social 
justice on behalf of former officers in the 
southern military and mutated into a secessionist 
movement on behalf of the entire southern polity. 
The latter’s incorporation into the national polity 
was through what they perceived as a 
colonization process that relegated them to the 
status of second class citizen, and whose 
persistent demand for social inclusion was 
ignored by the regime [70]. 
• Ānṣār Āllah: The sectarian northern autonomy 
movement of al-Ḥūthī who embodied the Zaydī’s 
doctrinal commitment to khurūj, i.e., rising 
against an unjust ruler. Their political discontent, 
which was already simmering from long-held 
resentment towards the state’s non-recognition 
of their distinctive religious creed and for its 
support of a Saudi-backed Salafist “invasion” of 
their region, was catalyzed into public protest, 
and ultimately military insurgency, by the 
regime’s collaboration with the United States’ 
war on terror [71]. 
The significance of the Arab Spring was its promise 
to engender the demise of the region’s exceptionalism 
in terms of its stereotypical representation as a political 
and cultural milieu inimical to the viability of modern 
democratic institutions of governance, given its 
association with the millennial tradition of tribe-centric 
patriarchal regimes and their polities’ chronic 
accommodation to the pathological rule of autocrats. Its 
ultimate failure in Yemen, especially of the youth 
movement, was not because of the intrinsic 
unreceptivity of Yemenis to societal transformation, but 
due to their low “threat quotient” to the state power 
holders and their inherent susceptibility to the 
opportunistic intervention of the same reactionary 
corporatist forces (i.e., the tribal confederations, the 
army and the Sunni Islamists). These reactionary 
forces undermined the modernist aspirations of an 
earlier generation of revolutionaries, and subsequently 
transformed the 1990 unification into an internal 
colonization process, and again have thwarted the 
emancipatory aspiration of the Arab Spring’s youth in 
the twenty-first century [72]. As one scholar aptly 
observed: “Yemen’s Arab Spring was more an 
internecine fight between regime elites than a popular 
revolt that deposed a dictator” [73, p. 3]. In contrast, the 
persistence of the other two movements suggests the 
ultimate vulnerability of the cabalistic corporatist state 
and its political system of endemic elite patronage and 
episodic mass clientelism when confronted with armed 
insurrectionary movements whose leadership could not 
be co-opted. Paradoxically, the “success” of these two 
armed movements have unleashed the centrifugal 
forces that have been contained since the civil war of 
1994; thereby opening Yemen’s own Pandora’s Box.  
There are three centrifugal tendencies that were 
embedded in the state formation process in Yemen, 
and that are now unchecked and thus could engender 
the profound social, political and geographical 
reconfiguration of the country as highlighted below:  
• Ṭā’īfīyya (sectarianism): The re-imposition of the 
sectarian territorial division that prevailed under 
the Imamate between “Upper Yemen” (al-Yaman 
al-‘alā) and “Lower Yemen” (al-Yaman al-asfal), 
which articulated the subordinated relationship 
between the population’s two dominant 
confessional allegiances – the minority northern 
Zaydī and the majority southern Shāfi’ī. This 
socio-geographic configuration is being 
entrenched by the Ḥūthīs’ regime maintenance 
practices that not only promote a sectarian 
solidarity as a political mobilization strategy but 
also seek to re-establish the primacy of a 
confessional identity over a national one: The 
restoration and semantic revision of the 
antagonistic genealogical bifurcation between 
the descendants of ‘Adnān (as ordained rulers of 
Yemen) and those of Qaḥṭān (as sociopolitical 
subordinates of northern Arabs); the public 
display of posters of political leaders of Iran and 
Lebanon as the new icons of political allegiance; 
the instrumentalization of the public performance 
of Shīʿa religious rituals into mass spectacle of 
political intimidation; the recourse to a primordial 
discourse of social hierarchy between the Ḥūthī 
elite and the rest of society, as exemplified in the 
invocation of the reverential title of “Sīdī” or “al-
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Sayyid” in referring to the Ḥūthī leader and in the 
frequent use of status distinction epithets to 
enforce political subordination such as al-qanādīl 
(to refer to the Sāda as enlightened leaders) vs. 
al-zanābīl (to refer to the non-Sāda population as 
deferential followers); and the dissemination of 
Zaydi religious doctrine as a means of political 
conversion of youth, women and military 
personnel of the former regime into adherents of 
the Ḥūthī cause [74, 75]. 
• Infiṣāliyya (secessionism): The rekindling of the 
deeply felt sentiment of political incompatibility 
entrenched within the north-south geographical 
division engendered by the perceived colonial 
annexation of southerners as second class 
citizens following the civil war of 1994, and its 
symbolic enshrinement in the daḥbāshī 
syndrome according to which the north is 
perceived as a culturally backward tribal enclave, 
in contrast to the south as a culturally urbane 
milieu. The endemic use of this term served to 
sustain a distinct South Yemeni identity under 
northern domination. 
• Manāṭiqiyya (regionalism): The spreading 
demand for autonomous regional formations. 
Worthy of note is that regionalism once 
symbolized a provincial chauvinism that was 
deployed as a strategy of rule by the north to 
assert its “ethnoterritorial” primacy over the 
nation, is being re-appropriated as a rationale for 
dissent and justification for the pursuit of regional 
autonomy. This quest for regional autonomy 
reflects not only an endemic resistance to being 
subordinated to the north-dominated cabalistic 
state, but also a strong desire for separate 
regional identifications based on distinctive 
confessional or cultural factors over a national 
identity that since unification was assimilated into 
an exclusively northern tribal identity. 
Equally alarming is the emergent phenomenon of 
“ethno-national othering” between ordinary citizens 
from the north and the south as if they belong to an 
alien ethnicity and nationality. This practice originates 
from a synergy of the three centrifugal forces – 
sectarian polarization, regional identification, and 
national separation – and is leading to a secessionist 
nationalism especially among southern residents. It 
may become an unsurmountable obstacle to sustaining 
the unitary nation-state as it seems animated by a 
combination of hostile sentiments: Revanchist 
animosities based on memories of their colonizing 
experience with the north and the resulting lack of 
empathy with northerners; and political resentment 
towards people from the north for their unwitting 
accommodation with the Ḥūthīs. Consequently, 
northerners are no longer seen as people of the same 
nation, and whose entry into the south is now being 
regulated and who are ostracized when encountered 
by people from the south [76].  
4.2. The NDC: “New Yemen” Stillborn 
The antidote to these centrifugal forces was 
supposed to be the Comprehensive National Dialogue 
Conference (NDC), which was held from 18 March 
2013 to 21 January 2014. According to the rather 
hyperbolic declaration in the Final Communiqué, the 
gathering “provided a unique forum of its kind, and an 
unmatched political process which has no precedence 
in the history of Yemen neither the entire Arab region”. 
It was a “great national feat”, which “became the most 
prominent political transition in terms of participation 
and transparency in the Arab region” [77]. To be sure it 
is not the first such national dialogue in Yemen’s 
history, as it is an established tradition of resolving 
conflict or addressing issues of national importance 
that inaugurated the perennial, and still unfulfilled, 
quest for Yemen’s socio-political modernization since 
the 1930s [78]. Hyperbole aside, the process itself was 
an achievement. In spite of the praiseworthiness of its 
process, the NDC was first and foremost the brainchild 
of stability-conscious regional monarchies and security-
minded Western capitals that culminated in the “Gulf 
Cooperation Council Initiative” and was supported by a 
coterie of donors known as the “Group of Ten” [79]. 
Therefore, the NDC was a strategic attempt to co-opt 
the youth-led movement by diverting their street protest 
into a negotiation process under the leadership of the 
Ṣana‘ā’-based members of the cabalistic state’s 
patrimonial core and their political clients.17 Indeed, it 
exemplifies the elite-centric political decision-making 
culture of the cabalistic state.  
                                            
17 This is evident in the fact that the majority (68 per cent) of the 565 
conference delegates (nearly double the members of Yemen’s parliament: 301) 
were members of regime-colluding political parties, and whose involvement 
with the larger public is largely through clientelistic practices. More telling is the 
fact that the overwhelming number of youths who participated in the NDC were 
not independent but were affiliated to parties: 105 out of the 145 seats 
reserved for youths. Moreover, the organization of the NDC betrayed the 
opportunistic patronage ethos of the cabalistic state, as each delegate received 
a daily stipend averaging $2,600 a month, which exceeded the annual GDP 
per capita of $1,473, and thus suggests a form of political bribe to induce 
citizens’ participation and acquiescence.  
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Nevertheless, its lexical choices broadly captured, 
or more aptly pandered to, the aspiration of the Arab 
Spring’s youth. As the Communiqué puts it: Its 
deliberation sought “to create a participatory future that 
draws new foundations for a modern civil Yemeni state” 
that is based on “a new social contract for Yemen”, 
which represents an “irreversible emancipation” from 
the past and “lays the ground for a rebirth of our 
people”, while restoring “the confidence of the people in 
the State” [77]. More importantly, the NDC 
Communiqué is replete with critical acknowledgements 
of the state’s multiple failures and that highlight its 
capture by cabalistic forces: “We are fully aware that 
the absence of effective institutions of government 
allowed the penetration of narrow interests of the few to 
control and manipulate and even seize power to serve 
their goals and ends”. And it recognizes that the 
devolution of the state is the ultimate solution to 
Yemen’s current centrifugal political tendencies: “The 
transfer of powers and responsibilities from the center 
to the new regional authorities will put an end to the 
monopoly of power, will ensure equitable distribution of 
wealth and brings the institutions of governance closer 
to local communities”. This would establish “a climate 
of trust between citizens with each other, and with 
public institutions”. 
As in the past when state-building in Yemen 
became entangled in regional political conjunctures 
with unintended consequences for the nation’s fate 
(e.g., 1962 and 1990). Again, in 2013 when the NDC 
was launched, the country was entangled within a 
historical conjuncture configured by the contradictory 
interests of international, regional and local actors: (a) 
the security anxieties of the US-imagined “international 
community” animated by its partly self-inflicted war on 
terror, (b) the sectarian animosities between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran competing for regional hegemony, (c) 
the political machinations of rival northern-based elite 
factions over the re-apportionment of power, and (d) 
the youths’ emancipatory expectations induced by the 
Arab Spring. The denouement of the negotiations over 
these interests ultimately derailed the national 
reconciliation process and accelerated the 
disintegration of the national polity. The plenary 
consensus that could not be achieved through public 
deliberation over the final architecture of Yemen’s 
federal system during the NDC was replaced by 
political bargaining among the twenty-two member 
Regions Committee. The decision that was announced 
in February 2014 to establish a federal system 
composed of six “new regional authorities” was the 
catalyst to the unravelling of the NDC’s aspiration for a 
“New Yemen”. 18 It was promptly rejected by the main 
stakeholders, al-Ḥirāk and al-Ḥūthīs among others, who 
saw it as an attempt by northern elites to maintain their 
monopoly on power. In contrast, it was agreed to by the 
governing party (the GPC) and by the main opposition 
Islamist party (al-Iṣlāḥ), which are opportunistic 
colluders as they are both opposed to the separation of 
the south and the autonomy of al-Ḥūthīs in the northern 
province of Ṣa‘ada. Indeed, the federal structure seems 
to be an elaborate cartographic manipulation, and 
administrative re-engineering, of the nation-state’s 
political geography, which would have had the 
following, perhaps intended, ramifications: (a) to 
contain the political self-determination of both the 
northern and southern movements; (b) to suppress 
other regions’ aspiration for autonomy (e.g., 
Ḥaḍramawt, Soqotra); (c) to entangle decision-making 
within the politics of bureaucratic infighting that would 
be engendered by the new federal administrative 
superstructure; and (d) ultimately to sustain the 
dominance of the cabal of northern elites and their 
regional allies that constitutes the tribal-military-
business complex [80].  
The political opposition to the federal system’s 
structure led to three fatal events: (1) on 3 January 
2015 the Ḥūthīs forcibly prevented the formal 
presentation to the President of the final draft of the 
new constitution for a federal state, as the Chairman of 
the NDC was kidnapped on his way to deliver the 
document; (2) on 6 February 2015 the Ḥūthīs 
formalized their take-over of Ṣana‘ā’ with the 
establishment of a Revolutionary Committee as 
Yemen’s governing body; and (3) on 25 March 2015 
(five days after the Ḥūthīs captured Aden) Saudi Arabia 
launched its war on Yemen. Since then Yemen is 
embroiled in both a civil, and inter-state, war that has 
eradicated over half a century of relative developmental 
                                            
18 Yemen would be renamed the Federal Republic of Yemen, to be 
composed of six regions encompassing the 22 provinces, and which would be 
organized along a north-south axis that replicates the country’s division prior to 
unification. There would be four regions in the north and two in the south. The 
four regions of the north and their constituent provinces are as follows: (1) 
Āzāl: (capital city Ṣana‘ā’) Ṣa‘ada, ‘Amrān, Ṣana‘ā’ and Dhamār; (2) Sabā: 
(capital city Mā’rib) Al-Jawf, Mā’rib, and al-Bayḍā; (3) Al-Janad: (capital city 
Ta‘iz) Ibb and Ta‘iz; (4) Tihāma: (capital city al-Hudaydah) Ḥaja, al-Maḥwīt, al-
Hudaydah and Raymah. The two regions of the south and their respective 
provinces are as follows: (5) ‘Aden: (capital city ‘Aden) al-Ḍal‘i, Laḥij, Ābyan 
and ‘Aden. And (6) Ḥaḍramawt: (capital city al-Mukallā) Shabwa, Ḥaḍramawt, 
al-Mahrah and the Soqotra Archipelago. The city of Ṣana‘ā’ will have a special 
status in the Constitution to guarantee its independence and impartiality vis-à-
vis all other regions. Also, the southern port city of ‘Aden will be given 
independent legislative and executive powers.  
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progress through: (a) the systematic destruction of its 
social infrastructure (e.g., roads, schools, health 
centers, factories, marketplaces and civilian 
residences); and (b) the generational loss of human 
development through demographic attrition resulting 
from war-induced mass internal displacement, mass 
external migration, mass impoverishment, chronic 
malnutrition, rampant spread of diseases and 
thousands of deaths. With ‘Alī ‘Abdāllah Ṣāliḥ’s killing 
on 4 December 2017, Yemen’s formerly manageable 
political tensions have fractured into irreconcilable 
antagonisms.  
There is a historical irony in the trajectory of the 
emergence of the modern state in Yemen. Its inaugural 
moment occurred in the midst of an Arab Cold War that 
pitted the revolutionary Egyptian republic against the 
primordial Saudi monarchy, which fought a proxy war in 
Yemen to determine whether its fate would be as a 
republic or a monarchy. This process is being re-
enacted in a new regional cold war between Sunni 
Saudi Arabia and Shī’a Iran who are using Yemeni soil 
as the theater of a new sectarian proxy war. The first 
cold war ended with Yemen as a democratic republic, if 
only nominally. However, this new cold war has not 
only already rendered obsolete the federal state 
envisioned by the NDC, but also may lead to the 
demise of the Yemeni state in its current configuration 
through (a) the permanent restoration of the pre-
unification north-south division, (b) the reinstatement of 
the Imamate-like theocracy in parts of the north, and (c) 
the creation of other regionally-demarcated political 
entities. Even if federalism is improbably adopted, the 
pervasiveness of the cabalistic state’s venality-
promoting governance culture and its perversion of the 
nation’s civic ethos will ensure the replication of its rent 
seeking economic practices and of its endemic culture 
of corruption within the federal regions and their 
constitutive provinces. Alas, Yemen has lurched into a 
socio-political wilderness with an inscrutable future. 
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